Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great honour for me to be the keynote speaker at the 10th Anniversary of your Institute. I congratulate you wholeheartedly and wish you every success also in the future. Institutes such as yours play an important role in deepening understanding and promoting active interest in global foreign policy challenges and issues.

Security is a topic very close to us all. The provision of peace and security for its citizens is – or should be – a basic function of every state. However, interpretations of security and ways to achieve it vary, often causing great grievances between and within societies. In a globalising world, we all are more and more dependent on each other, which leads to closer cooperation between states than ever before. In this speech, I will try to outline how the European Union is developing and responding to new challenges and how we in Finland see security in today’s world.

Looking back, a lot has happened in ten years’ time. The newly independent states in the Western Balkans and in the former Soviet Union have unfortunately not developed without difficulties. We have witnessed many armed conflicts and even war both inside and between countries, with great losses and human suffering. Both old and new threats have escalated, especially terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but also issues such as ethnic intolerance, environmental threats, pandemics, drugs, cross-border organized crime and uncontrolled migration. At the same time, international awareness of these problems has increased, too, and perhaps even the will to address them.

In Europe, the European Union has been able to simultaneously expand and deepen its integration. Looking back, it is actually a small wonder how far the EU has come in ten years both in its internal workings as well as in its outlook. Of course, the road has not been without difficulties, which have been sometimes clearly visible also to the outside world.

Finland became a member of the EU in 1995. The Treaty of Maastricht had just been concluded, establishing the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. One of the reasons behind the treaty was the aftermath of the break up of ex-Yugoslavia, where the EU found itself regrettably inadequate.

That traumatic experience gave the Member States the will to develop the crisis management capabilities of the EU, culminating in the so-called Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999. There the EU committed itself to a course to be able to respond to future crises roughly the size and type of that of the Western Balkans. This involved a military crisis management force of about 60,000 soldiers. What for example Finland actively advocated was also the development of the EU’s civilian crisis management capability.

During the new Millennium, we have seen devastating terrorism and other crises which have given security problems a whole new dimension. The challenge posed by international terrorism and crises in different parts of the world have called for appropriate responses also from the EU – both civilian and military.

Security- and defence-related activities and exchanges of views in the European Union in the past few years have focused on the very concrete and practical questions about developing our joint resources and capabilities in this field. The EU is rightly expected to bring something new and added value to international politics, partly because it is not a state but a unique kind of actor, partly because of its particular set of strengths and instruments and, finally, because of its belief in a rules-based order, which grows out of the history of European integration as a peace project.

The basis for the work is formulated in the European Security Strategy, approved in December 2003. It is a concise document of only 14 pages. It describes the global challenges that the EU has to address, such as poverty, diseases, malnutrition, lack of security, economic failure and also the key threats, including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. According to the strategy, the EU’s strategic objectives are to address the threats, build security in its neighbourhood and establish an international order based on effective multilateralism. And finally, it sets out policy implications for the EU.

According to the Security Strategy, the EU needs to be more active in pursuing its strategic objectives. It also needs to be more capable, more coherent and work in close cooperation with partners. These principles apply to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at the EU’s disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities.

In the field of capability, the EU has made great progress in the last few years and the process continues. It has identified shortfalls and ways to address them both in the military and civilian sectors. At the moment, an especially topical question is the development of a rapid reaction capability, involving both decision-making structures and procedures and actual military forces to be used based on the so-called Battle Group Concept. Equally important is the development of rapid civilian crisis management capabilities for example in the field of rescue services, the rule of law, civilian police and administration.

In this context, it should be reaffirmed that the Union is, first of all, equipped for addressing the root causes of conflicts and preventing violent conflicts. The Union is not and will not become a military great power, but it can become an effective actor in conflict prevention and crisis management. This involves, not only or even primarily, military crisis management but also economic cooperation, aid, civilian crisis management and so forth.

Greater coherence is one of the goals of the new Constitutional Treaty of the EU to be signed on October 29 this year. Improved coherence is expected to be achieved, for example, by nominating a longer-term President for the European Council, as well as by an EU Foreign Minister with a European External Action Service.

Working with partners means all the countries and organisations, but especially the United States, Russia, the UN and NATO.

The EU-US relations is a two-way street. There are differences of views not so much about the objectives as about the means of addressing security threats, which are reflected in the Security Strategy. They are not issues that should cause any transatlantic conflicts but rather items which need to be addressed in the continuing transatlantic dialogue. We should all seek to engage the United States in the multilateral framework envisaged in the Union’s strategic outlook. NATO is one important expression of the transatlantic relations.

Developing and implementing the strategic partnership between the Union and Russia is a central task. The Strategy does not provide practical guidelines but makes clear the importance of values and norms for the common future of this relationship. The practical challenge is with us every day, as the Union pursues its European agenda: enlargement, security and stability in the neighbouring regions and implementation of its strategy towards Russia. They are all strategic tasks in their own merits, but the success of each of them is vital to a stable and prosperous Europe. Success in building the relations with Russia and solving both acute and frozen conflicts in our common neighbourhood is therefore not a zero-sum game but an enterprise to everyone’s benefit.

Next, I would like to explore some thoughts on how I see the linkage between security and globalisation. Even if globalisation is primarily about technology, development and welfare, it is also a security issue. Globalisation can be taken advantage of by means of participation and engagement. On the other hand, as recognized in the European Security Strategy, an isolated country or a marginalized group may cause security problems.

Globalisation imposes a special requirement on leadership in international politics and on the accountability of leaders in domestic politics. Democracy should be strengthened and improved in both domestic and international institutions. Finland has launched an international process, co-chaired by me and my Tanzanian colleague, to address the issue of reforming the way international institutions make decisions and, more broadly, finding better ways for governments, businesses and civil society to engage in a dialogue about their common future and to come forward with concrete, implementable proposals. To put it in another way, we aim at building bridges between economic and social forces behind the World Economic Forum – Davos- and the World Social Forum – Porto Alegre.

The connection between globalisation and security should be better addressed with the instruments at the disposal of the EU and its Member States. We are all engaged in bringing development cooperation and security policy closer to one another, as well as supporting good governance and sustainable development, thus eliminating the root causes of conflicts.

The most central objective in the Security Strategy is the establishment of legal and security order, based on effective multilateralism. This is where the Union can make its greatest contribution to the world and where it can expect to bring the greatest benefit for the Union itself and for the values it represents. In the long run, multilateralism is also the only sustainable way to combine security and development in a more equitable world.

The United Nations and the Security Council are at the core of the multilateral order, and their central position should always be supported and recognized. However, effective multilateralism is an even more demanding objective, because it calls for a reform of the world organisation and assurance of an effective and just decision-making by the Security Council in preventing, managing and resolving conflicts. The Union has effectively made it clear that its improving crisis management capability will be put primarily into the service of the United Nations.

Few issues are more important for multilateralism than the legitimacy and legality of the use of force whether by nation-states or the international community. The Security Strategy makes no immediate headway on the question of mandating interventions. It is understandable, as there are different experiences and national policies among the members themselves, not to mention the sensitivity of the issue at large. We would have wanted the Security Strategy to be unambiguous on the issue that is under such a pressure today, in particular as the EU is likely to assume new tasks and operations in the future.

To the extent it is necessary to look anew at the question of justified self-defence before an imminent threat or at the problem of mandating humanitarian and other interventions, the Security Strategy correctly recognizes the problem. The European Union will continue to be in the forefront of such a discussion. The Security Council is called upon to uphold its responsibility for international peace and security. If new interpretations of international law are called for, the Security Council is the proper forum for doing so.

I was pleased to hear that Secretary-General Annan put so much emphasis on the rule of law in his speech at the UN General Assembly two weeks ago. As he said, the vision of “a government of laws and not of men” is almost as old as civilisation itself. Yet, the rule of law as a mere concept is not enough, laws must also be enforced, both internally and externally. I believe that a world more fair is also a world more secure.

The EU – and Finland – condemns terrorism in all its forms and irrespective of its stated aims. As the Secretary-General Annan put it, ”no cause, no grievance, however legitimate in itself, can begin to justify such acts” as happened in New York, Madrid, Beslan and elsewhere.

We all have a duty to do whatever we can to prevent such acts from happening and punish those responsible. The EU has improved both its internal cooperation and the cooperation with partners in various fields and is ready to carry on. What is especially important is the low-key, practical, everyday cooperation in the financial, judicial, intelligence and law-enforcement sectors. But also in the action against terrorism we should not resort to means that do not respect the rule of law and human rights, because that would inevitably erode the basis of our societies.

It is also clear that we can never eradicate terrorism by using police and military means only, no matter how necessary they are in fighting this kind of crime. We must also tackle the root causes of terrorism, including the deprivations, poverty, humiliations and lack of perspective associated with continuing, unresolved conflicts, which also constitute a breeding ground for extremism, fanaticism and even terrorism.

The Finnish Government has recently submitted to Parliament a white paper on the development of our Security and Defence Policy. It is no wonder that most of the recommendations are very much in line with the European Security Strategy. In addition to what has already been said, I would like to mention a few points.

We estimate that since the previous report in 2001, Finland’s neighbouring areas have become more stable along with the enlargement of the European Union and NATO, the deepening integration in the European Union and the transformation in Russia. At the same time, however, the broader international situation has become increasingly challenging for Finland. Global problems, development crises and regional conflicts have become increasingly significant also for our security. This trend is expected to continue.

Membership of the Union, which is based on solidarity and mutual commitments in all areas, serves to enhance Finland’s security. We support the Union’s enlargement process, neighbourhood policy and the development of justice and home affairs as principal factors promoting security in Europe.

Finland contributes towards strengthening the EU’s common foreign and security policy and participates fully in developing and implementing the common security and defence policy. We are developing our capabilities and readiness to participate both in the EU’s civilian crisis management activities and military crisis management operations, including rapid response forces.

We believe that well-functioning transatlantic relations are important for both European and international security. Our partnership and cooperation with NATO will continue to develop side by side with respect for our military non-alignment. Cooperation needs to be implemented in a spirit of global responsibility, shared basic values and respect for international law. We are continuously monitoring the reforms taking place in NATO and how its international role will develop. Applying for membership will remain a security and defence policy option for Finland also in the future although we do not see any reason to exercise it in the foreseeable future.

Finland will actively participate in international cooperation to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to enhance arms control. We will promote the implementation of the EU’s weapons of mass destruction strategy bilaterally. National readiness to control exports, among other things, will be improved further and we will participate actively in arms control and disarmament arrangements applying to conventional weapons, such as small arms and light weapons. Finland will accede in 2012 to the Ottawa Convention on the prohibition of anti-personnel land mines, and destroy its land mines by the end of 2016.

In addition to significant long-term development cooperation, we give separate assistance for shorter-term prevention and after-care of crises. Finland lays stress on the importance of human rights policy as a security-shaping factor and emphasizes in particular the rights of women, children and minorities.

We will be active also in preventing environmental threats. The principal areas of interest that we will be engaged in are predicting the impacts of climate change, protecting the Baltic Sea, preparing for risks associated with accidents in neighbouring areas and increasing the safety of international shipping in the Baltic Sea, especially the Gulf of Finland. We will remain active also in other fields of international environmental cooperation.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

A Government Minister certainly finds it a somewhat trickier task to predict the future than does an academic researcher. I am, however, fairly confident that also the political role of the European Union will grow in the next ten years to resemble more its economic significance.

Although the EU will not become a military might, the wide range of its instruments and capabilities will be an important security factor in the globalising world. Conflicts and problems may persist, but what is crucial is whether basic issues such as human rights, the rule of law, fair economic development and environmental problems can be addressed. There we all need to work closely together.

Thank you.

Opening Address

It is a great honour for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland to act as the host of the seventh Global Europe 2020 session, now held in Helsinki. This seminar concludes the first series of seminars on the EU’s future external relations. In the previous sessions, diplomats, experts from the academic world and non-governmental organisations have discussed the EU’s relations with the rest of the world. We are happy that Finland has been chosen as the final destination of this “world tour”.

The new Constitutional Treaty of the European Union will be signed in a few days in Rome. This is therefore a very timely occasion to discuss the changes that the new Treaty will bring to the EU’s external policies. The development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU demonstrates the power of political will and shows how six, later 12, 15 and now 25 nation states with different historical backgrounds have been and still are capable of finding common views in the area of foreign policy.

I am very pleased to speak to you today about the EU’s foreign policy and external action, and to share with you the experiences that Finland has gained during the ten years of membership.

After the end of the Cold War, the economic and political environment has changed dramatically. We have entered the age of globalisation. We identify new threats that are much more complex than the old ones. At the same time, the EU is in the process of enhancing its diplomatic action and developing military capacity to respond to crises across the world.

The EU was founded as a response to the Second World War. In many ways, its greatest triumph is that European leaders now argue about fish quotas instead of disputing frontiers.

Political integration has been understood to be one of the key objectives of Europe since the foundation of the Coal and Steel Community. From the early days on, Europe has also been expected to become an actor on the world stage in its own right.

However, it took several decades before foreign and security policy was adopted as one of the Union’s tasks. Foreign policy cooperation was first developed outside the Community structures. A major step was taken when it was integrated in the same institutional framework under the Single European Act in 1986. The Maastricht Treaty on the European Union established the intergovernmental pillar of the CFSP, including the defence policy dimension. The Amsterdam Treaty further developed the defence policy dimension in the field of military crisis management. I wish to recall that the defence-related Articles of the Amsterdam Treaty are based on a Finnish-Swedish initiative.

The new Constitutional Treaty lays the foundations for the Union to play a more prominent role in world affairs. One of the most significant reforms concerns the EU’s external representation. The EU Foreign Minister will replace the biannual rotating Presidency and represent the Union abroad in CFSP matters.

In the 1990s, the EU’s foreign policy was constantly criticized for its failures. In most cases, the reason for the difficulties was lack of political will, in particular among the bigger Member States. The EU was not capable of preventing violence from escalating into war, or of managing crises in its own neighbourhood.

The weakness of the Union to respond to instability and tensions was undermining the credibility of the Union in the eyes of partners and the people of Europe. Europe was urged to do more for its own security and the stability in the world and to do more to protect democratic values internationally. Europe was even made an object of ridicule because it overestimated its capacity to handle the Yugoslav crisis. The EU could not deliver.

It is true that Europe failed to get its act together in the 1990s on a policy for the Balkans. Europe was impotent because it was not united.

Finland was at that time knocking on the door of the EC. The four candidate countries were impatiently waiting that the 12 European foreign ministers would finish their lengthy discussions concerning an effort to agree on a common policy on the Western Balkans and move to membership issues.

Things have changed. The EU has been able to formulate a common foreign policy on the Western Balkans, on the Middle East and on many other issues.

During the first decades of integration – the major achievements being the single market and the monetary union – Europe was inward looking. Today, the EU needs to change in tandem with changes in the rest of the world. The Union needs to be prepared to global challenges, which are both economic and political.

The EU’s strength lies in building stability through long-term action, but unfortunately these achievements rarely make big headlines. The EU is at its best in making third countries participate through contractual relations, offering incentives in the form of market access and assistance programmes combined with strict criteria on democracy and human rights.

The enlargement process is the most efficient form of conflict prevention and consolidating peace and stability in Europe. The European integration has definitely modified the map of our continent. Ten new members are now helping to shape a larger Europe, and will eventually show that the division of Europe in East and West has been overcome once and for all.

This integration method has proved to be effective in providing stability and progress. The rapid development in many candidate countries shows that the prospect of accession to the European Union accelerates democratic and economic reform processes based on the rule of law.

The CFSP must adapt to new requirements. The institutional structure of the European Union with different pillars has been an obstacle to developing a coherent external policy. Promoting coherence between different policy sectors has been a constant endeavour in the Union. One of the objectives of the new Treaty is to find means to overcome the institutional hurdles. Foreign policy cannot be confined to one pillar only. Efficient external action must integrate national policies, community policies and the CFSP itself. This is the only way to promote a comprehensive approach to peace and security. Moreover, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish the difference between external and internal security.

In spite of the many setbacks, the CFSP has developed fast. Over the last five years the EU has made the most rapid progress in the area of security and defence. We have every reason to believe that also in the coming years intergovernmental cooperation will be the driving force of the development of the EU. It appears very likely that progress in the Community policies will slow down after the enlargements. The new Member States need to assimilate completely the existing acquis before envisaging additional steps.

Even if new initiatives in Community policies may be less numerous, the Community method is still viable. I believe that the Community method will be more efficient in the enlarged Union than the intergovernmental model, which has been based, in most cases, on unanimity in decision-making.

As long ago as during the negotiations concerning the Amsterdam Treaty, Finland supported the possibility of qualified majority voting in the context of CFSP decisions, excluding decisions related to security and defence policy, which have to be made in unanimity also in the future. In our view, compromises in the field of foreign policy should be guided by the views of the majority and not imposed by one or two Member States that may be willing to block a common action. We regret that in the new Constitutional Treaty the Articles on CFSP decision-making do not go far enough in this regard.

Flexibility or reinforced cooperation in the field of the CFSP is another matter that has been raised for discussion. Flexibility has been said to ensure that the CFSP functions properly also in the enlarged Union. Finland has from the outset approached the proposals on flexibility with an open mind. It is important that cooperation among Member States takes place within the institutional framework. Some elements of flexibility, which can be applied also in the CFSP, are introduced in the new Treaty.

We all know that the Union’s role is stronger if we can agree on a common policy line. Europe can play a part in and exercise influence on international projects when we are unified. The Union can shape the future of the world when speaking with one voice.

Making the Union a more coherent actor has been a long-term pursuit. The EU’s Security Strategy, which was adopted by the Council last year, includes several useful suggestions to that effect. The Constitutional Treaty will bring new helpful elements. Most importantly, the Union will have to learn by doing.

What are the major international achievements of the EU in the past years?

I want to mention a few.

The Union is already a significant global actor. It is a world leader in both trade policy and development cooperation. The Union has also played an active role in the promotion of environmental protection, consolidation of international law and, in relation to this, markedly contributed to the success of such important projects as the International Court of Justice and the Kyoto Climate Protocol, as well as the commencement of the WTO Doha Round of negotiations. There is a great demand for the kind of global role that the Union has assumed.

The EU was actively involved in setting up the International Criminal Court. The ICC has become a reality and is now operational. It is a cornerstone in the efforts to enhance respect for international humanitarian law and human rights around the world.

The Doha Round should convince those who do not believe that the EU is an important actor that can promote our common interests. With 25% of the world output and a third of the world trade, the EU gives us the economic weight to push forward the Doha Round of trade liberalisation. For the EU to succeed in this, it is imperative that we fully take into account the needs and concerns of the developing countries. We have to do this notwithstanding the pressure it will put on us for further reform of our agricultural policy.

Trade policy is at the core of the Community business. The competences are clear. Only the Community can enter into agreements with third countries, only the Commission has the power to negotiate on behalf of Member States. The size or number of the Member States does not matter. The EU is respected as a negotiator. The Union has, for a long time already, been an equal partner to the US and other nations in trade policy issues. There is no risk that the Member States would conduct their own policy. They are simply not entitled to do so because of the Treaties.

In the past, the EU and its institutions were overlooked in transatlantic relations, and Brussels was not seen as a counterpart. The Member States favoured bilateral relations or NATO in building transatlantic cooperation. This has changed considerably. The EU’s security and defence policy has strengthened the position of the Union in the transatlantic structures. The change in the security environment has also consolidated the role of the Union. New security threats require preparedness in various fields, not only military capabilities. The EU’s policies in justice and home affairs are of great relevance in the fight against terrorism.

An effective global European role is not in contradiction to a strong partnership with the United States. The EU and the US can tackle challenges of global poverty, disease, weapons proliferation, religious fundamentalism and terrorism by working together. A balanced partnership can only be built on shared responsibilities and rights. Sometimes the interests and positions may differ without causing any damage to the foundation.

The EU should also be sensitive to concerns, even if they are in our view unfounded, by other countries, fearful that the transatlantic partnership could become too dominant in world affairs and seek to enforce a condominium of rich northern countries over the rest of the world. We have to acknowledge that the EU is regarded as a singular actor on the world scene, drawing on its experience of building peace and prosperity through economic and political integration. The transatlantic relationship is a two way street. It is up to the Europeans to engage the United States in the multilateral framework envisaged in the Union’s strategic outlook.

The EU is developing as an international player. However, too often the Europeans still hesitate to take the lead in world affairs.

The EU’s security strategy sets guidelines for its future external action. It is no surprise that the threat assessment is similar to that of others. We live in a world where threats are global, not local. Today’s threats to our security come from outside the EU’s borders: environmental threats, terrorism, proliferation, conflict, state failure and international crime.

In the past, the EU developed security thinking in different policy fields, but an overall doctrine was missing. The EU’s security concept has been built over the years on different policies. Since its origin, the European integration has been firmly embedded in the wide concept of security. This approach aims at strengthening interdependence.

When the EU started to develop military capabilities for crisis management, the same comprehensive approach was adopted: to project peace and stability by using all tools and instruments that are at the disposal of the Union from humanitarian aid to military capabilities. I want to underline that our future challenge is to adapt the crisis management responses to different crisis situations. Conflicts have changed and so must the operations. We are not dealing with aggression by states but violence against human security. An integrated approach combining both full civilian and military crisis management is called for.

The EU has become more ambitious and is willing to take the lead. The EU has been actively engaged in seeking a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. In its security strategy, the EU underlines the importance of a treaty-based system in combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction. It is therefore legitimate to expect that the EU use all its influence in persuading other states to comply with multilateral treaties.

In the case of Iran, the credibility of the whole non-proliferation regime is at stake. The EU as a whole is engaged even if only three Member States are more actively involved than others. The Iranian nuclear issue poses a critical test for Europe. Iran maintains that it has the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but any nuclear activity requires full transparency and compliance with contractual obligations. The ball is now in Iran’s court. We sincerely hope that Iran would accept the package solution proposed by the EU.

In the longer-term we must see to it that our efforts in strengthening non-proliferation are comprehensive and coherent. We must also fulfil the implicit obligations the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty puts on nuclear-weapon states, intensify our efforts to get the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force and ensure that the Middle East as a whole will become a nuclear-weapons free zone.

In the past, Europe was criticized for being absent in the Middle East Peace Process. Its contribution was limited to paying bills but the EU has started to play a more prominent role in the Middle East Peace Process in the past years. The EU is a peace process facilitator. It is also one of the four partners of the Quartet, together with the United States, the Russian Federation and the UN. The EU was significantly engaged in drafting the road map.

Let me now address the future challenges.

We need more Europe.

But the EU cannot act alone, not even with the United States only. We need effective multilateralism. The new security environment requires that we seek partners from all over the world. We need to cooperate with regional leaders such as Japan, Brazil, India, Russia and South Africa. We need to work in concert with all nations of the world.

We need better structures and procedures to formulate and implement the CFSP.

But we should be careful not to demolish – when the new Treaty enters into force as we hope, in 2006 during the Finnish Presidency – what has been built over the decades in the Community in the field of external relations. The CFSP must be developed and its scope expanded, but this should not happen at the expense of the Community.

It is important that decision-making in the CFSP remains in the hands of the Member States represented in the Council.

What will change most with the new Constitutional Treaty is the implementation of the CFSP. Under the present Treaty, the Presidency is responsible for conducting the CFSP. The Amsterdam Treaty created the post of the High Representative for the CFSP to assist the Council and the Presidency. Following the entry into force of the new Treaty, the Foreign Minister will represent the Union in the CFSP, and together with the Commission when community matters are involved. Since the EU Foreign Minister will also be appointed vice-president of the Commission, the EU will finally be represented by one person, speaking – hopefully – with one voice.

The EU will play a more prominent role in international organisations. It seems that an EU seat in the UN Security Council belongs to a distant future. The EU should implement its CFSP in the UN and other international organisations as agreed by the Council. Member States – even the smaller ones – are keen to maintain their national profile and presence. However, here again, the EU makes a difference when its ranks are united. The new Treaty opens up possibilities.

There is, of course, a real possibility that the ratification of the constitutional treaty will be delayed, or even aborted. That would obviously be a new crisis for the EU. But from a point of view of the CFSP such an eventuality, while certainly disappointing, need not be catastrophic, as we are already moving forward on the basis of our existing treaties on implementing almost all of the new articles pertaining to the CFSP and ESDP. The European Defence Agency has already been established, the rapid reaction forces will come into existence with active participation of Finland and almost all EU member states and we have already evoked the solidarity clauses of the new treaty.

Coherence is the key word in making the EU more visible in the world. Coherence implies coordinated action of different policy fields of the Union. Coherence also means that Member States should follow an agreed policy in their bilateral relations with third countries. All Member States will maintain bilateral diplomatic relations with other countries, including with EU partners. It would be erroneous to believe that every foreign policy issue is channelled through Brussels. What is important is that bilateral action must not undermine the policy agreed among the 25. We need to be consistent, but there is room for national profiles.

The EU is taking its place on the international scene. We need to be united to manage globalisation. We should not seek to become masters of the universe, but masters of our own future in a more global world.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

During this closing session in Helsinki, you will tackle issues that are of great importance in laying a foundation for the future role of the EU in the world as a reliable partner and as an active player. We need a vision. I am convinced that you can make a valuable contribution in shaping this vision.

Keynote Speech

One of the most demanding challenges for the European security policy is to understand the future; and not only to envisage the future but also to have a well-grounded vision and a concrete set of responses to it. Right now we are in the middle of a rapid global change, which might have dimensions that we can’t or are not willing to see clearly today. But in order to put this change into a perspective, let’s first have a look at the Nordic security of the last century.

Most Nordic countries became independent and adopted a foreign policy of their own less than a 100 years ago.

Sweden has the longest tradition of neutrality and has not been at war since 1809. The other Nordic countries, and certainly Finland, had various reasons, both geographical and historical, to experiment with different alliances and policies with different degrees of hope pinned on the League of Nations to safeguard their security, until they all finally converged together in the late thirties, forming a kind of neutrality bloc of their own.

Both Finland and Sweden tried to create a kind of de facto military alliance, but finally were unable even to implement the agreement on fortification of the Åland Islands.

During the Second World War, only Sweden remained both outside the war and unoccupied while Finland was attacked by the Soviet Union but was never occupied A Nordic defence alliance between Norway, Sweden and Finland was briefly on the agenda in 1940, but it was unattainable. Would such an alliance, had it been created in the 1930s, have been able to keep the Nordic countries outside the war remains an open question.

Different realities and different perceptions as to the direction threatening the Nordic countries’ security effectively made it impossible to reach a Nordic or even a Scandinavian security agreement after the Second World War.

Denmark, Iceland and Norway joined NATO, Sweden retained its traditional neutrality and Finland also wanted to pursue a neutral policy within the parameters set out in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, signed with the Soviet Union in 1948.

With time, the different security arrangements of the Nordic countries became to be viewed as a whole known as the Nordic balance. An important part of it was the fact that Denmark and Norway, while members of NATO, did not accept permanent military bases on their territory, and that the USSR returned the Porkkala military base to Finland in 1956.

The different choices of the Nordic countries did not prevent them from developing an effective network of Nordic agreements, institutions and cooperation. They created the kind of citizens’ Europe with a free movement of people, a common labour market, and mutual social security coverage and right to vote in local elections for all Nordic citizens everywhere in the Nordic area, which only later became a reality in the enlarged European Union.

The Nordic countries were also engaged in extensive cooperation within the UN, where they formed a distinctive group of their own. They all took an active part in the peace-keeping activities of the UN and were pioneers in development cooperation. They were all early on engaged in issues that today would be called working for a broad concept of security.

With the end of the Cold War, the security framework has radically changed also in Northern Europe. Formally, the Nordic countries are still bound by different solutions to their security: while Sweden and Finland have joined the European Union and take an active part in the development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), they have no current plans for joining NATO, while Iceland and Norway have not wanted to join the EU. Denmark also has its reservations about the EU’s security and defence policy.

In practical terms, these differences matter less and less. Sweden and Finland are active members of the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) while Norway is ready to join the Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) for enhanced crisis management that the EU is developing. All five countries share the analysis of the broad threats to security and the need for effective multilateral cooperation in meeting these challenges, as well as an understanding of the limits of military power in combating new threats, such as terrorism or the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let us now move on to the challenges of this century. The Government’s report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy, adopted in September this year and presently being scrutinized in Parliament, recognizes fully the common European and global challenges. Actually the preparations of the white paper started in parallel with the preparations of the European security strategy. And it shouldn’t be a surprise to anyone that the two documents provide a nearly consistent analysis of the threats and challenges of our century, even if the volumes are of a different size.

The main thread running through the Government report is change in the security, both in reality and in conceptual terms. While the enlargement of the EU and NATO, deepening integration of the Union as well as changes in Russia in the longer perspective have increased stability in our neighbourhood, global problems, development crises and regional conflicts play a more prominent role in our security environment. Along with globalisation our internal and external security have become increasingly dependent on the overall global security.

Furthermore, the Finnish Government underlines the need to increase cooperation at all levels because the security threats are increasingly of a cross-border character. Now the key threats include terrorism, the threat of the proliferation and use of WMDs, regional conflicts and the use of military force, organised crime, drugs and human trafficking, economic and technological risks, environmental problems, population growth, population migrations and epidemics.

Today all the Nordic countries share the same global Nordic security policy environment. In this respect the Nordic countries are closer to each other than ever before in history.

Our relations with the Baltic States are also very close. We could speak about an enhanced Baltic Sea security policy, which involves new threats and common challenges in the region, such as environmental risks, HIV/AIDS and organised crime. These issues are discussed in many regional organisations, including the European Union, but need for streamlining certainly exists, especially when all the Baltic Sea States except Russia are Member States of the EU.

This assessment of security and the consequent need for a broad set of tools, often of a new type, and the required commitment and solidarity in this regard are to certain extent quite new to the Finnish public opinion. At the same time, this approach is a logical continuation of the Nordic security thinking.

One of the underlying themes of our security and defence policy is the need for a more effective multilateral cooperation and an enhanced role of international law. No country, however capable, can reach its ultimate security goals alone. Another major theme is the idea that the use of military force cannot be the only solution to security threats. Coherence of relevant policies, such as foreign, security and defence, development, human rights, environmental and trade policies is needed. The third element is the notion that internal and external security are interlinked. Threats affect the everyday security of individuals and societies, not our sovereignty. No nation, be it a superpower or a small country like Finland, can prevent threats like proliferation of WMDs or environmental risks relying on national means only.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The European Union is at the core of the Finnish security and defence policy. Membership of the Union, which is based on solidarity and mutual commitments in all areas, serves to enhance also our security. It’s not only a question of a functioning Common Foreign and Security Policy or rapidly evolving security and defence policy. The deepening integration in various areas, strengthening of the euro area, a smoothly functioning internal market or more efficient Schengen cooperation and development of the justice and home affairs also contribute to our security. The Union’s enlargement process and the development of the Wider Europe Policy are crucial for the security of Europe.

Finland wants to develop the Union towards a stronger and more capable global actor. The Constitutional Treaty strengthens the Union as a security community and we support this development. The Treaty has many important commitments in the field of the CFSP, including the ESDP. One of the most visible ones is, of course, the establishment of the post of the Union Foreign Minister and the European External Action Service (EEAS), which Finland sees as important steps in enhancing the coherence of the external action. It’s important that in the preparatory phase, which should start soon in formal structures, ways and means can be identified to improve the practical and effective coherence while respecting the competences. Most of the new elements in the Treaty can and also will be put into practice despite possible delayed ratifications, which describes well the common commitment to develop the Union’s capabilities to act especially in this field.

The Government’s report underlines that Finland participates fully in the development and implementation of the European common security and defence policy. The Union’s coherence, solidarity and common commitments also in this area serve to enhance Finland’s security.

As regards responding to an emerging conflict, we emphasize speed, flexibility and early action. The situation must be viewed as a continuum where many tools from conflict prevention, combined civilian and military crisis management and post-conflict elements constitute one entity, also in the concrete planning and use of capabilities. Let me add that it is easy to say this, but making it a reality calls for hard work, which we are ready to contribute actively. An important element in this regard is human security, and therefore the proposals of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities convened by Professor Mary Kaldor at the request of Secretary-General of the Council of the EU Javier Solana, merit a detailed study.

We participate fully in the development of the Union’s capabilities. Our commitments in civilian and military crisis management, as announced in yesterday’s Capabilities Commitment Conferences, are greater than our share of population of GNP in percentage terms. We are developing our national capabilities, both civilian and military, in order to at least maintain our participation at the present level, and preparing for a changing operating environment with new modes of operation.

As an example, Finland will be participating in two Battle groups; one with Sweden in which Norway will also participate, and the other with Germany and the Netherlands. The development of the European Rapid Response Forces serves also as a good example of the development of the permanent structured cooperation concept provided for in the Treaty.

In fact, active participation in prevention of conflicts and crisis management as well as in development of the ESDP are areas where the Nordic countries have been and will be at the European forefront. Despite the fact that they belong to different formal security policy constellations, concrete cooperation in peace keeping and crisis management has been close and fruitful. The Nordic Brigade is a concrete example of this, as well as our participation in Nato-led operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, where we work closely together.

A crucial element of both Finnish and European security strategic thinking are the Union actions in arms control and in preventing terrorism. The Union’s WMD strategy is an important tool. Also other arms control issues, such as limiting the trade and spreading of small arms and light weapons, call for action. We will also be active in improving the Union’s counter-terrorism activities. It is important to put emphasis on the longer-term measures targeting at the underlying causes and also developing the counter-terrorism capabilities in developing countries.

The global basis for our security policy is our commitment to the UN Charter and to strengthening the rule-of-law in international relations. Finland will also contribute to the European and global security by participating in UN operations and as an active NATO PfP partner and by participating in NATO-led operations, as now in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Applying for membership will remain a possibility also in the future. We are naturally monitoring closely the transformation of NATO and contributing actively to the development and functioning of the EU-NATO -relations.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Being a militarily non-allied country is presented in the new white paper not as a doctrine but as a factual statement. It is referred to only in connection with how we are organizing our defense: ”Finland maintains and develops its defence capability as a militarily non-allied country”. We are of course all allies in the EU. The Treaty Article on the obligation to provide assistance and also the solidarity clause unequivocally commit the EU Member States to assist each other if one of them is drawn into an unprovoked crisis situation. At the same time, the Union is not a military alliance, and thus the description of Finland’s military non-alliance is factual in this respect, too.

Our defense policy seeks to maintain a credible national defense. At the outset, this might sound more traditional than the preceding security policy lines in the white paper.

Indeed, the continuity of the Finnish defence, based on conscription, territorial defence and a wartime mobilization (350 000) that is sufficient to defend the whole country, is continued. At the same time, also the Finnish Defence Forces will undergo the same restructuring for technological, financial and demographic reasons as the other Nordic countries, but not on the same scale. Conscription is also the most cost-effective way of organising national defence. For the time being our defense spending will continue at the present level.

International military cooperation is a crucial part of the defence policy and an active participation in crisis management operations also supports national defence.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Nordic States form today a security policy community with similar values, goals and views on preferential instruments. Our goal is a world where the international community strengthens its cooperation at all levels and between all relevant actors, not only states, in order to respond to more and more complex and unpredictable security challenges with an open and innovative mind. To get there, we work for a Union which will be a stronger global actor using all tools at its disposal in a coherent and unified manner. This is the shared Nordic vision for the future European and Global security policy.