Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid. Why Aid Makes Things Worse and How There is Another Way for Africa, Penguin Books, 188 s., St.Ives 2010

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Kehitysapu remonttiin
  
Dambisa Moyon kirja Dead Aid on hyödyllistä ja ajatuksia antavaa luettavaa, vaikka Björn Wahlroos onkin kirjan mainetta tarpeettomasti mustannut sille suitsuttamallaan ylistyksellä. Sen sanoma on nimittäin paljon monipuolisempi ja analyyttisempi kuin pelkistetty ja väärinymmärretty viesti, että kaikki kehitysapu on pahasta ja siksi lopetettava. Kannattaa myös keskittyä kirjan sisällön analyysiin, sillä sen kirjoittajan idealisointi kauniina ja nuorehkona afrikkalaisena naisena ja useita tutkintoja suorittaneena Oxfrodin yliopiston tohtorina ei ole kirjan asian arviointiperusta, yhtä vähän kuin hänen demonisointinsa kymmenen vuoden pestistä markkinamanipulaatioskandaaleissa ryvettyneen Goldman Sachsin finanssimarkkinakonsulttina.
 
Moyon sanoma ei suinkaan ole se, etteikö Afrikka tarvitse rahaa rikkaista maista, vaan että se tapa jolla sitä valtioidenvälisenä kehitysapuna on annettu, ei ole Afrikkaa juurikaan auttanut. Länsimaiden apu on päinvastoin ylläpitänyt ja ruokkinut riippuvuutta, tehottomuutta ja korruptiota. Afrikka tarvitsee rahaa ja investointeja, mutta ne on hankittava markkinoilta markkinaehtoisesti, jolloin markkinavoimien kuri pitää huolen siitä, että rahahanat sulkeutuvat heti, jos tulosta ei synny tai raha katoaa väärinkäytöksiin. Moyo pyrkii myös esimerkein osoittamaan, että se on mahdollista kun Afrikan maat oppivat sen, mitä markkinoiden luottamuksen ylläpitäminen hyvänä hallintona edellyttää. 
 
Wahlroosit ja muut kehityspolitiikan oikeistolaiset vastustajat toistavat mielellään näitä näkemyksiä ja mitä tahansa argumentteja, joilla verovaroilla rahoitettuja menoja voidaan leikata, mutta heidän voi olla jo paljon vaikeampaa niellä Moyon yhtä rajua kritiikkiä Yhdysvaltain ja Euroopan protektionistista kauppapolitiikkaa ja maataloustukia kohtaan, jotka aiheuttavat Afrikan maille suurempia menetyksiä kuin mitä julkinen kehitysyhteistyö korvaa. Vielä enemmän he saattavat nikotella, kun Moyo kirjoittaa Kiinasta afrikkalaisten ystävänä ja kiittää sen kehitysyhteistyö- ja investointipanosta Afrikassa.
 
Moyon esittämän väärin suunnatun ja korruptiivisia rakenteita ylläpitävän kehitysyhteistyön kritiikki on täysin perusteltua samoin kuin hänen ohjelmallinen näkemyksensä, että kehitysyhteistyö tulee ajaa alas ja korvata normaaleilla kauppaan ja taloudelliseen yhteistyöhön liittyvillä rahavirroilla. Enin osa kansalaisjärjestöissä toimivista kehitysmaa-aktiiveista on tuskin tästä eri mieltä.
 
Kirjan luomaan hypeen kuitenkin hukkuu se ettei Moyokaan välttämättä ole sitä mieltä, että kaikki kehitysyhteistyössä kehitysmaihin viety raha olisi pahasta, jos se osataan ohjata oikealla tavalla oikeisiin kohteisiin. On erittäin suuri ero niillä pienillä rahasummilla, joita köyhistä köyhimmät saavat esimerkiksi Moyon ylistämän Grameen-pankin mikroluottoina käyttöönsä ja Zairen edesmenneen diktaattori Mobutun kaltaisten kleptomaanisten johtajien pankkitilileille Sveitsiin päätyneen ulkomaisen avun välillä. Jälkimmäiset esimerkit liittyvät lähes aina tilanteisiin, jossa avunantajankaan ensisijainen prioriteetti ei ole kehitys ja ihmisten auttaminen, vaan omien poliittisten ja strategisten tavoitteiden edistäminen,
 
Avun täydellinen lopettaminen ei kuitenkaan ole ainoa mahdollinen johtopäätös, johon Moyon perusteltu analyysi voi johtaa. Avun tiukempi valvonta ja ehdollistaminen ja sen painopisteiden uudelleensuuntaaminen ovat parempia vaihtoehtoja. Lisäksi on niin, että Moyon suosittama yksityisten finanssimarkkinoiden laajempi käyttö kehitysmaiden tarvitseman,kehitystä palvelevan rahoituksen lähteenä näytti paljon uskottavammalta vielä kaksi vuotta sitten kirjan julkistamisen aikoihin kuin tänään, jolloin Afrikan maat ovat myös joutuneet finanssikriisin sivustakärsijöiksi pankkien rahahanojen sulkeuduttua.
 
Kesäkuu 2010
 

The Baltic Sea Region as an area of Peace and Security in the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 3. International Conference on Cooperation, Security, Climate Change and Biodiversity in the Baltic Sea Region in Berlin 11.-12.6.2010

Ostsee – Friendenssee is a familiar concept for those of us who were already active during the Cold War years. It was a theme actively promoted by the GDR, who hosted the yearly Ostseewoche in Rostock from 1958 until 1975, but discontinued after the GDR had with CSCE in 1975 achieved its long-standing goal of international recognition.
 
The efforts of the GDR and the Soviet Union to market their brand of Peace and Security were never really convincing, emanating as they did from two of the most heavily militarized states of the Baltic Sea Region. They were more correctly read as efforts to build up the Baltic Sea Region as a Soviet Mare Nostrum, where a kind of Pax Sovietica existed, with no open acts of war being committed.
 
War in history is not unfamiliar in the Baltic either. In Finland everyone knows the song ”Oolannin sota oli kauhea”, about the Crimean War of 1854-1856, better known in Finland as the Aaland War, when the British Navy landed on the Aaland islands and destroyed the fortress of Bomarsund and raided Finnish ports up to the northern parts Gulf of Bothnia. Both World Wars saw heavy fighting on the Baltic Sea and the lands surrounding the sea, only Sweden escaping being dragged into war on both occasions. Between the World Wars the Baltic was also a prominent theatre of Allied intervention in the Civil War in Russia, with British torpedo boats using Finnish territory to base their attacks on Kronstad.
 
There are thus sound historical reasons for the Russian preoccupation with securing the Baltic approaches and not allowing them to fall into the hands of her potential enemies.
 
But advances in military technology had already during the Cold War begun to erode this concept of security and undermine the defensive doctrines behind it. One sign of this was the Soviet readiness to withdraw from its Porkkala base close to Helsinki in 1956, already 40 years before the original lease imposed on Finland in the Armistice Treaty of 1944 ran out.
 
In the seventies detente started slowly being felt in the Baltic Sea Region too. We should not overlook the role played in this respect by the new Ostpolitik introduced by Willy Brandt, nor the unintended and originally much underestimated consequences that the so-called third basket provisions in the CSCE Final Document signed in Helsinki in 1975 had for developments in Central and Eastern Europe, gnawing away at the foundations of centralized and totalitarian Communist Party rule.
 
Today we are in situation in the Baltic region which has no precedents in history. The Baltic Sea is today an open region for everyone. It is almost an inland sea, or Mare Nostrum, of the European Union, but since the EU has neither the capabilities, pretensions nor needs to become a military Super Power, or to create any exclusion zones, this should not carry any connotation of exclusiveness or sinister intentions anyone should be suspicious of.
 
The Baltic Sea for the first time has only democratic countries on its shores, even if we do need to be concerned about the commitment to and sustainability of real democracy in many states of the region and particularly Russia. Apart from the EU (and Nato) all Baltic Sea countries are members in the same international organisations and are obliged to recognize and implement the ever-growing amount of binding commitments they have signed on to in these fora.

   Military security in the Baltic Sea region

Does this mean that concerns about traditional military threats to security have disappeared? Obviously not, for there are understandable historical reasons for why concerns and fears may linger on for much longer even after the threats themselves have disappeared. And even if power politics and resorting to the use of military power, is no longer able to deliver any longstanding benefits to anyone hardly anywhere in today’s world, and certainly not in the Baltic region, the mind-set where power politics germinate will take a long time to dissolve. This applies to both those who are perceived as perpetrators as well as those regarded as victims of power politics, also bearing in mind that the difference between the two is not always as clear-cut as we like to think.

To be sure, there are still too many weapons, including nuclear weapons, in or close to the Baltic Sea region. Regional initiatives to reduce these are always welcome, but as these weapons are not deployed primarily for reasons related to the region itself, their reduction is more likely to come about as a result of more comprehensive and global disarmament and arms control negotiations.

There is, however, one item on the arms control agenda which could and should be tidied up in the region, and that is the non-adherence of the Baltic countries as well as Sweden and Finland to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The countries concerned have nothing to lose from joining the treaty and it would also give new life and credibility to the CFE and lead to the re-engagement in the treaty which was ”suspended” by Russia in 2007.

There are also other issues where states could also act to involve the military also in enhancing confidence and cooperation in the region. As maritime safety is a common concern for all our countries we should engage our navies, which no longer have much use as a deterrent for potential invaders, to cooperate on maritime surveillance and rescue services. This has been proposed as new common assignment for the Nordic countries in the Stoltenberg Report, but I see no reason why this could not be extended to all countries in the Baltic Sea region.

    Broad security in the Baltic Sea region

The Baltic Sea region today is an area in the world where the new threats to the broad concept of security are central. We have them all: degradation of the environment and in particular the deteriorating ecology of the Baltic Sea itself, nuclear security concerns, cross-border crime, drugs, trafficking in human beings, TB, HIV-AIDS and other communicable diseases. While we do not have home-grown terrorism in the region nor any failed states close by, the threats these entail can nevertheless reach the region and cause incidents, even if they originate in far-away places. Neither should we overlook, that there are still minority and other issues which are potential threats as long as they remain unsolved in a manner satisfactory to all concerned.


The fragile ecology and deteriorating health of the Baltic Sea itself is a source of growing and well-placed concern. 3O years after the entry into force of the ”Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area” (the Helsinki Convention) signed in 1974, we can either regard it as a half-full or half-empty glass. Due recognition should be given to the undeniable achievements in reduced discharges of course, but this is a small consolation if the levels of pollution are still enough to endanger the marine environment.
 
The Baltic Sea is endangered when countries round the sea are developing their trade and industries for economic gain without adequately weighing their impact on the ecology. The increasing transport of oil on the Baltic Sea is an indication of wealth-creating economic activity, but at the same time entails a growing risk of accidents. The equivalent of an Exxon Valdez incident or the blow-up of the BP oil rig Deepwater Horizon in the Caribbean could literally kill the vulnerable Baltic Sea.
 
As environmental issues will be discussed more in depth at other sessions in this seminar I will not continue on this, except to raise the issue of the North Stream gas pipeline under construction across the Baltic Sea.
 
There are many reasons to welcome the North Steam gas pipeline, as an example of the kind of trans-national cooperation which will promote positive interdependence between Russia and the EU. I find the concerns expressed about the pipeline as an instrument or excuse to increase Russian military presence and activities in the Baltic Sea region to be unfounded. Should Russia want to increase her military presence she will not need any pipe line excuses, and as far as the security of the pipe line is concerned that is an object for mutual cooperation rather than any confrontation.
 
The environmental concerns the North Stream pipeline has raised in many countries are legitimate, but have been also exaggerated, also for reasons that have little or nothing to do with the environment. After all, it is not as if we are dealing with a new and untested technology that carries inherent risks. Gas pipelines have been criss-crossing the worlds seas for several decades without reports of any serious damage or environment-threatening accidents. A gas pipeline is certainly much more preferable and safer method of transportation compared with the equivalent amount of energy being transported in surface vessels over the Baltic.

But given the especially vulnerable conditions in the Baltic Sea it is essential that the project must respect the most stringent environmental requirements and use the latest state-of-the-art technology. Since the project is a joint Russian-German venture the participation of German interests in it has, frankly allowed us to regard the project with more confidence from an environmental point of view then if it had been a solely Russian venture.
 
The environment is not the number one priority on the Russian agenda. But this doesn’t mean that others around the Baltic Sea can afford to adopt a holier-than-thou attitude towards Russia in this regard. This also goes for Finland, which has in recent years clearly failed to live up to the reputation it had earlier earned along with the other Nordic countries as a standard-bearer for good and responsible environmental management. 
 
It is therefore imperative that the environment is so centrally place on the Baltic Sea cooperation agenda – at least as far as the paper-work is concerned. The environment is one of the four focus areas the EU’s Baltic Sea strategy. In the Northern Dimension it is one of the three partnership programmes. The newly created EU-Russia Modernization Partnership also refers to promoting a sustainable low-carbon economy and fighting climate change, but since this is one of the ten specifically mentioned ”priority areas” in the non-exhaustive listing of cooperation areas of this particular exercise, one cannot readily tell from this document, what the real priorities are going to be and what role will the environment in real terms play in them.
 
It is, of course, quite common in international cooperation that there are often more good intentions in our declarations and commitments than concrete examples of them being put into practice. The EU Baltic Sea strategy is ambitious and is even held up as an example fore other regions to emulate. It opens many new vistas and possibilities, but it is also demands that all of us in the region – and the Commission too – must deliver.

 For more things to happen in practice it is not enough that government ministers and officials hold regular meetings: also civil society, the social partners, NGO:s as well as the local and regional authorities have to be engaged.

This kind of engagement and particularly the people-to-people contacts it will facilitate and promote will also serve to enhance security and our common endeavours to be able to thwart new threats to broadly understood human security.

Keskustan valinnat

Keskusta valitsi uuden puheenjohtajan ja antoi kenkää myös puoluesihteeri Jarmo Korhoselle. Olen joskus kysyttäessä todennut, ettei mieleeni ole jäänyt ainuttakaan Mari Kiviniemen esittämää poliittista mielipidettä siltä ajalta, kun istuimme vuoden verran samassa ministeriössä, mikä ei tarkoita etteikö hänellä niitä olisi. Ja vaikka ne toistaiseksi tuntuvatkin kovin synteettisiltä ja ulkoaopituilta, ei häntä pidä kuitenkaan aliarvioida. Originellien omien näkemysten esittely ei ole välttämätön edellytys puoluejohtajana pärjäämiselle, joten hän voi osoittautua myös kepun kannatuksen kannalta hyväksi valinnaksi.  Kepun johdon uusiutuminen on varmasti laajemminkin politiikan tervehdyttämiselle hyvä asia. Nähtäväksi vielä jää, johtaako se myös poliittisen linjan tarkistuksiin tavalla, joka palauttaisi uskoa punamultayhteistyön mahdollisuuksiin ja voisi ryhdistää sosialidemokraattejakin. Kaikesta huolimatta on nimittäin niin, että näissä kepun kenttäihmisissä on kuitenkin enemmän solidaarisuutta pohjoismaisen hyvinvointivaltion perusarvoja kohtaan ja sellaista tasavaltalaista tasa-arvoajattelua, jollaista joutuu suurennuslasilla etsimään samaan aikaan kokoontuneiden fantastisen rehelliseen menoon ihastuneiden kokoomuslaisten kantajoukoista. Onnea siis kepun uusille valinnoille ja erityisesti hyvän ja asiapitoisen puheenjohtajakampanjan tehneelle varapuheenjohtajaksi nousseelle Timo Kaunistolle.  13.6. 2010

Kyproksen umpisolmu

Tapasin Suomessa vierailevan YK:n pääsihteerin Kypros-erityisedustajan, entisen australialaisen ulkoministerikollegani Alexander Downerin. Hän on ties kuinka mones YK:n edustaja Sakari Tuomiojan jälkeen, joka yrittää auttaa saaren kahtiajaon lopettavan ratkaisun löytämistä. Hän tietenkin toivoo, ettei enää joutuisi siirtämään tehtävää kenellekään seuraajalle.  Se on tietysti mahdollista, myös siinä tapauksessa ettei hänenkään aikanaan syntyisi ratkaisua. Neuvottelut kuitenkin jatkuvat pohjoisen turkkilaispuolen johtajan vaihdoksesta huolimatta, mutta ilman sitä kahden vasemmistolaisen entisen ay-aktivistin henkilökohtaista suhdetta, joka vallitsi Kyproksen presidentin Christofiasin ja nyt pohjoisen vaalit hävinneen Mehmet Talatin välillä. Talatin seuraaja on neuvotteluja vieroksuva oikeistonationalisti  Eroglu.  Hän joutuu kuitenkin kuuntelemaan herkästi Turkin isännän ääntä, ja kun EU:iin edelleen mielivä Turkki haluaa neuvotteluratkaisua pysyy se turkkilaispuolen agendalla. Turkki tietää, että ilman Kypros-ratkaisua sen muutoinkin ohdakkeinen tie unioniin pysyy blokeerattuna.  Sotilaallisen konfliktin uusiutumisen mahdollisuus kiistan ympärillä on onneksi käynyt hyvin epätodennäköiseksi ja aika moni alkaa EU:ssa jo olla perinpohjin kyllästynyt Kyproksen umpisolmuun. Solmu ei aukea niin kauan kun edellisen Annan-suunnitelman tyrmänneet Kyproksen kreikkalaiset eivät halua liikkua tuumaakaan saaren yhdistävän sopimusratkaisun aikaansaamiseksi. Se tarkoittaa sitä, että jaosta tulee silloin pysyvä ja yhä useampi EU-maakin tulee de facto tunnustamaan Pohjois-Kyproksen turkkilaistasavallan aseman ja lopettamaan pohjoisosan eristämisen. Tätä ei edelleenkään voi pitää toivottavana saatikka ihanteellisena ratkaisuna, mutta siihen kehitys on väistämättä johtamassa, jos ennenaikaisen EU-jäsenyytensä turvin asemansa vahvaksi uskova Kyproksen kreikkalaispuoli ole valmis liikkumaan.  7.6. 2010

Global democracy. Allianssin Youth, Development and Security -seminaarissa 3.6. 2010

Erkki Tuomioja,

PhD. MP; Former minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland

 

For several centuries world politics have been analysed and conducted on the basis of a Westphalian world order, created in 1648 by the Treaty of Westphalen – where sovereign actors – originally sovereign rulers rather than sovereign nations states – were the sole actors who counted, or had the right to be counted. Now, in the globalized world of today the whole concept of absolute sovereignty has become a rather theoretical construction as interdependence has inevitably eroded its foundation. 
 
The growth of the world’s population has irrevocably changed the world and is the most obvious reason why interdependence – whether we like or not, in both thing good and bad, is a reality that no-one can escape. This applies to all and any countries, big or small, armed with nuclear weapons or not, and irrespective of whether they embrace globalisation or would want to opt out of it. 
 
The world’s population has during my lifetime grown threefold from 2,3 billion when I was born after WW2, to 6,9 billion today. And although it is now true that this growth has begun to even out, the number of people on earth will reach at least nine or ten billion before we can attain zero population growth. 
 
This has enormous consequences for how mankind interacts with its natural environment. We have only very recently become aware of how unsustainably we have managed our natural resources since the start of the industrial revolution. This awareness has been largely brought about by climate change, which is the number one challenge to our security and survival in the world today.
 
It may be that, even at best, we have only a few decades time in which to adapt our behaviour to the exigencies of ecologically, socially and economically sustainable development. I don’t think anyone can say for certain, whether we can achieve this sustainable balance in time to save the world or not.


What was still possible and workable in a world with a few hundred million or even 2 billion people is no longer valid in a world with 6,9 billion people, let alone with more than 9 billion. This undermines one of the defining features of the Westphalian order, namely the use of power politics, including resorting to war to further you national interest to and gain advantage at the cost of other nations or the environment.
 
Leaving all moral and ethical considerations aside one cannot deny that this way of furthering one’s national interest, and the power politics used as its instrument, could, in many cases bring benefits for limited periods of time anyway – limited, because no empire in history has lasted for ever. But the complex nature of today’s post-industrial societies make reliance on military power and force more and more unproductive as software and knowledge, rather than hardware and muscle power, are the key to success and well-being. 
 
In addition one must also recognize how Weapons of Mass Destruction have changed the scope and context of power politics. But even without resorting to WMD also the development of so-called conventional weapons has drastically changed the nature of war. If the aim of military power to defend civilians and society then it has been progressively failing as casualties in today’s wars mainly affect those not in uniform.

Increasing and deepening the international division of labour, which is essentially what globalization means, has brought huge benefits in terms of enhanced growth, strengthened potential for the realization of Human Rights and better environmental management, increasing wealth and wellbeing. And this has not been limited to the already more better off parts of the world. That hundreds of millions of  people have been lifted out of abject poverty and from living in the shadow of recurring famines, particularly in China,  India and elsewhere in Asia, would not have been possible without taking advantage of the global markets created and opened by globalization

The challenge is, that these benefits are not distributed equally around the world or inside different societies with many people becoming distinct losers in this development. On the contrary it seems that income and wealth differentials are increasing, both within countries and regions and between them.

The second huge challenge is exercising democratic control over the processes involved in globalization. In a sense this means giving an adequate answer to the question ”who is in charge?”. 

While democracy has never in history been so widespread in terms of the absolute number of people and the relative proportion of all people in the world who can elect or dismiss their governments in more or less free and fair elections, there is also a growing feeling, particularly in the older and established democracies, that democratic elections have become irrelevant as those elected are not really in charge and increasingly resort to mouthing  the slogans of the current TINA-doctrine – meaning  ”there is no alternative – used to justify whatever is the programme of the day of  the government in office.

Diminishing belief in the possibilities of democracy has led to growing voter apathy on the one hand, and increasing belief in the necessity of and justification for extra-parliamentary activism, which need not always be regarded negatively, as long as it firmly keeps to non-violent methods.

  National and Global Democracy

The former Speaker or the US House of Representatives Tip O’Neill is known for his observation, that ”All politics is local”. I think this reflects a deep wisdom about the origins and nature of democracy, and is a useful reminder that democracy cannot be introduced on a continental, let alone global level, if it is not firmly rooted in national or even regional and local levels.

Democracy has, indeed, been essentially a national project, and when the power of national governments to steer the economy have been eroded and taken over by international agreements and organisations and/or anonymous global market forces, they have been perceived to have become impotent. This perception corresponds to reality, even if this impotence has often been exaggerated with the intention of getting electorates to acquiesce more easily in what governments actually have themselves chosen and/or to dismiss the possibility for alternative choices.

Globalization calls for global democracy. This does not mean that we could begin to build this with a globally elected world parliament or, even end up with a world parliament. We shall have to realistically recognize that global governance will for the foreseeable future remain the domain and responsibility of  inter-governmental cooperation in international organisations.

Only the European Union can with any credibility claim to have tried to address the issue of bringing democracy into its intergovernmental supranational decision-making. And in the EU it is, in my opinion, rather the efforts to involve the national parliaments of the member states in exercising control over the proceedings and decision-making in the Council, rather than the European Parliament as it exists today, that can enhance the inadequate democratic legitimacy of the union.

I make a specific point of mentioning the European Union because I regard the EU at present, with all its well-known faults and shortcomings, as our best available instrument in endeavouring to achieve better management of globalization and enhancing global democracy.

Global democracy is also served by the emergency of a Global civil society and the technologies which have made it much more difficult for authoritarian regimes to control and censor the use of modern communication technology, such as the internet. Global democracy is also enhanced by reforms in international organisations which seek to give both parliaments and civil society some sort of, albeit limited and mostly advisory role, in international organisations and negotiation processes, even if they remain in the sphere of inter-governmental cooperation.

Democracy needs stable and legitimate institutions, but they are not enough. A vibrant civil society, free and accessible media and a fair distribution of resources for civic and political participation are also necessary. Here the globalization of civil society can be seen as having developed in some respects further than formal trans-national institutions.

This said it should be absolutely clear, that here can be no global democracy without democratically ruled countries and states.

So far in history there is not a single example of any genuine democracy worth the name, which does not include freely constituted political parties, competing with each other in free and fair elections.
 
I state this categorically, not as an answer to those who in the 20th century used to claim that single party-regimes, whether of the Communist, Fascist or Nationalist variety, were somehow superior to multiparty democracies, which undoubtedly had, in many instances, rather poor track records in terms of producing stability, wellbeing and efficient government for their peoples, particularly in the 20’s and 30’s. In those circumstances, and even after the Second World War, apologists for single-party regimes could also point out how their single parties in an almost mystical way had solved class and other conflicts in their societies by harmoniously bringing together the nation in the only party allowed, usually under the leadership of a wise and benevolent Dear Leader.
 
Even in today’s world one may find such examples in many places, and not only in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea. China is of course a much more sophisticated and, at least in economic terms, an even admirably well-run country, but it nevertheless is a non-democratic single party state. The Chinese regime no longer seeks to justify its continuation primarily in terms of Marxist-Leninist or any other ideology, but rather as the system of government, which not only is necessary to achieve undeniable economic success, but is also the only reliable way, in which such a vast country can be managed and kept together in a stable manner.
 
But the remark about multi-party democracy is, at least in a European context, no longer needed to stave of off calls for single-party regimes. Rather it is necessary because in most if not all of our more established democracies in Europe there is a growing dissatisfaction with democratic institutions in general and with political parties in particular.
 
This dissatisfaction is often reflected in falling voter turnouts in elections and in a sometimes not so cordial loathing of political leaders, but so far not in any real demand for replacing democratic institutions with authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, with or without one or more political parties. Most of those dissatisfied with party politics are not calling for a new single-party or for other authoritarian solutions; rather they are engaged in a wishful hankering for some sort of more direct democracy, which gives a direct voice to citizens.
 
But however dissatisfied we are, and irrespective of how justified this dissatisfaction is, we should remember that political parties are a necessary condition for any real democracy, just as are parliaments acting as legislators, no matter how corrupt, undeserving or just plain stupid we may deem our elected representatives to be.
 
But while parties are still a necessary condition for real democracy, they are not sufficient. There are, of course, also many countries around with outwardly open elections and quite a host of parties, but which do not necessarily meet our understanding or real democracy, but this is not the point. The point, rather, is that even countries like the Nordic countries, which we like to think meet all the requirements of genuine democracy with a free press and no manipulation whatsoever of elections etc., would be sorely lacking if they did not have vibrant and free civil society working alongside with and sometimes challenging the political establishment and its established political parties.
 
Historically all the Nordic countries have a long tradition of civil society and popular mass movements interacting with the political system. Not only the Social-Democratic parties qualify as mass parties with roots in the labour movement, but other parties too have their roots in mass movements of a nationalist, agrarian or religious kind.
 
In today’s Nordic societies parties and civil society have undergone substantial changes. The most obvious trend has been the steady erosion of membership in political parties and some of the traditional NGO:s. This does not necessarily mean that interest and participation in political participation has fallen in a similar manner. The Nordic countries have traditionally had a rather high rate of voter participation in National elections. This has slightly declined but remains at a relatively high level, except in Finland which has seen a more dramatic fall. 

To return to the headline of my remarks: Global Democracy: what is it needed for? Democracy is, of course, a value in itself. But it is even more. I find it difficult to believe, that we could achieve the kind of better global governance needed to bring about the kind of ecologically, socially and economically sustainable development that is essential for saving the world as an humanly inhabitable environment without Global Democracy.

The instrument for delivering this kind of global governance should of course be the United Nations and its special organisations. This is true although a minority of UN member states fulfil the criteria we should have for genuine democracy. Effective global governance must be universal and kicking countries out of the UN for their violations of democracy and human rights is something that can only be contemplated in very rare cases and extreme circumstances.

  G 20 and global governance

But what should we think of the G20 which only in a few years time has evolved to become perhaps the most relevant forum for discussing and also implementing better global governance?

Of the many G combinations the G20 has the best claim to of global representation. The G20 countries account for 90 % of the world’s GNP, 80 % of world trade and two thirds of the world’s population. Meeting and taking decisions in this forum is a belated recognition of the fact, that in a world facing its first truly global recession and the equally urgent and global threat of climate change, no lasting solutions can be found if a large share of the world’s population is excluded. This also entails including the poorest of the poor, who have had the least say in all global processes.


But the self-appointed G20 is not an international organisation and has no established rules of procedure. That is a source of strength compared with the institutional paralysis which seriously impedes the speed and efficiency of many international institutions and negotiations, but it is also a weakness. To become universally binding and workable almost all decisions taken by the G20 have also to be adopted by many international organisations and agreed on by their member states, and in many cases ratified by them as well.
 
The most serious weakness of the G20 as a self-appointed forum is its lack of legitimacy. This creates increasing resentment particularly in the vast majority of the world’s countries who are excluded from its meetings. It is also an added incitement for all the demonstrators who regularly besiege the venues of any G group meeting. One answer to this legitimacy deficit could be combining G20 reform with reform of the UN Security Council.


Even if the Security Council reform has not moved anywhere in the past few years, it is not yet dead either. The multiple crises the world is facing today should have helped to create some sense of urgency and willingness to move forward with the dormant reform agenda.

We have to be content with less than perfect solution. The veto of the present five permanent members cannot be abolished in the foreseeable future, nor will there be a single seat for all the members of the European Union. But some official positions notwithstanding there is a consensus that there will have to be more permanent members on the Council with no new vetoes. The inclusion of Brazil, Germany, India, Japan and an African country as new permanent members can hardly be contested on any rational grounds.


An enlarged Security Council would also see the number of non-permanent countries increased so that the council would become a G21 or G25. The countries represented on the reformed Security Council should also take the place of the present G20. This new G20 (or G whatever the actual number of SC members) need not be any more institutionalised than the present one. The advantage of having the new group having the same composition as the Security Council is, that it would carry much more legitimacy as the participation of non-permanent changing members will mean, that every country has the possibility of being elected to the group for two years.
 
Another advantage of having the G20 being made up by all the members of the Security Council is, that these countries will at least partly have the contact and negotiating framework needed for the G20 already in place working on the issues handled by the Security Council. Governments should give urgent and serious consideration to this and other proposals which seek to address the democracy and legitimacy deficits of global governance in today’s world.