Avauspuheenvuoro ”Building a culture of Accountability – Action Against Impunity in the External Relations of the EU”. Helsinki 29.9.2006

   
           
            ”Building a
Culture of Accountability – Action
Against Impunity in the External Relations of the European Union”

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very pleased and honoured
to open this seminar which the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is organising
together with Amnesty International of Finland. This seminar is one of the
highlights of Finland’s EU Presidency, when it comes to the promotion of a
rule-based international order, and it underlines our support for the common effort
to fight impunity. We strongly believe that the perpetrators of genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes, must not go unpunished.

It can no longer be considered acceptable that those
guilty of the most serious crimes would simply receive amnesty as a part of
national reconciliation or that their crimes would be buried and forgotten in
the archives.

The ”truth commission” as a means to settle
the guilt may tend to skirt the issue of accountability with the help of
politically guided judgement with differing opinions and interpretations
although it has proved useful in some cases. A more rigorous version of
distributing justice after long and bloody wars had in the recent history been
provided by trials such as those in Nuremberg and Tokyo in the aftermath of the
Second World War. But no matter how strict the rules of procedure and how
carefully defined the rights of the accused might have then been, the guarantees
of impartiality in those trials would not have filled the present criteria of
impartiality as an element in building up properly international
accountability.

The demand of international accountability has been
growing especially in the last fifteen years when the whole world has been
shocked by reports about large scale atrocities in several parts of the world
extending from Cambodia to the Western Balkans and to Africa. The international
community has been awakened to demand universally applied rules to punish those
who are guilty. The preference for legal processes vs. political processes is
clear. The world opinion has matured for universal and permanent solutions,
which would mean building up new institutions in order to prevent these crimes
from happening again in the future. There should be a legal system which would
have a similar preventive function on the international level as the courts and
criminal law have had on the national level.

The first international criminal courts were
established by the UN Security Council on the basis of Chapter 7 of the
Charter, to secure international peace and security. The International Criminal
Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia, ICTY, was established 1993, the
International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda 1994 and the Special Court of Sierra
Leone in 2000. Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the Special Court of Sierra Leone was
established by an agreement between the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone.

Their jurisdiction which is limited in time and area
has a primacy in comparison with the local courts and the governments have an
obligation to cooperate with them and to carry out their requests. In fact,
these obligations have not been fully honoured in every case and this has
revealed the tribunals’ inherent weakness that they have no enforcing machinery
if the cooperation by the local government is lacking.

Among these ad hoc tribunals the ICTY has had the
longest history and by far the greatest number of cases. It has indicted 161
persons and completed the process in 94 cases. By comparison, the ICTR has had
52 indictments and the Special Court of Sierra Leone, which has been
operational for just two years, has had 13 indictments.

The ICTY has been essential in establishing the
historical record of the bloodiest conflict in Europe since WW II and bringing
justice in the region. It has been able to indict and to convict many of the
leaders who are accused of the most serious crimes. Most importantly, the ICTY
has been a central institution to specify the individual guilt of the highest
leaders, so that whole nations or ethnic groups could be cleared against unfair
accusations.

The completion strategy of ICTY aims at finishing all
the trials in 2008 and other activities in 2010.

It seems now that the deadline of 2008 will have to be
extended at least to 2009. The task is still unfinished to the extent that 6 of
the accused are still at large among them the most important persons who are
accused of genocide, the gravest of crimes, General Ratko Mladic and President
Radovan Karadzic. The term conditionality has been often used to describe the
dependence of progress in the negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association
Agreement with progress in completing the mandate of the ICTY.

Full cooperation with the ICTY is one of the
preconditions of the European Union for the countries of the Western Balkans to
advance their European perspective. Finland fully supports this policy. It is
because of this conditionality that the EU called off the negotiations on the
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia last May. We now await
progress in Serbia’s cooperation with the Tribunal in line with the Action Plan
presented by Serbia in July.

The success of the effort of clearing whole nations´
reputation by individualising guilt of the atrocities in the former
Yugoslavia’s bloody civil war to the real perpetrators is at stake, if the
accused persons can continue to avoid justice. Assignment of the responsibility
would dispel the view that certain nations or ethnic groups should forever
carry the burden of their leader’s crimes.

In the completion strategy of the ICTY there are other
difficult questions besides the arrest of the 6 remaining fugitives, and
especially among them Mladic and Karadzic. The other parts of the strategy also
demand a lot of attention, whether they are complicated procedural issues, like
joining the accused in groups and making the Tribunals processes as efficient
as possible or conceptual changes like transferring some cases to the national
courts.

The Western Balkans will become an example of how the
fight against impunity can be continued, when the mandate of an ad hoc tribunal
runs out. The primary responsibility will be transferred to national courts.
The ICTY has already started to refer cases concerning lower and middle level
accused persons to these courts. Meanwhile, the State Court of Bosnia and
Herzegovina has already in 2005 opened its war crimes chamber to take up these
cases. The build up of local capacity through training of judges and prosecutors
is taking place also in Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. At this moment there
have been 8 accused, whose cases have been transferred to domestic
jurisdictions of the former Yugoslavia, 2 of them to Croatia and 6 to Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The rest of the cases being currently processed in ICTY
concern most senior leaders who are responsible for the most serious crimes
and, by definition, cannot be transferred to other courts.

The role of the local courts in fighting impunity is
more difficult in the cases that belong to the jurisdiction of the ad hoc
Tribunals, which usually have the primary jurisdiction in their area and also
have the obligation to focus on the most serious crimes and the highest
perpetrators. Referring cases by the Tribunal to the national courts might be
done easily, especially if the accused persons are political leaders still
enjoying large support. Referring those cases, however, would be contrary to
the purpose why the Tribunal has been established in the first place.

The national legal systems do have a very important
role to play, in the normal situation in the states where no Tribunal exists.
National courts have the primary jurisdiction also in genocides, crimes against
humanity and war crimes. Only in the cases where the local courts are either
unable or unwilling to act, can the International Criminal Court, ICC, start
investigations. The ICC jurisdiction however is restricted to crimes committed
after the Statute of Rome entered into force, the first of July 2002 and so,
would not apply to the on-going processes in the Western Balkans.

Ad hoc international tribunals cannot be the answer in
the long run to all crimes against humanity or genocides or war crimes. As a
rule, on the international level, fight against impunity will be carried on by
the International Criminal Court, ICC which has a broader jurisdiction, a
permanent mandate and is independent from political expediencies.

The ICC is a young institution, its statute entered
into force in July 2002 when 60 countries, Finland and all the other EU member
states among them, had ratified its statute. The EU had committed itself to the
creation of the ICC from the very outset and considers it a historical
achievement which remarkably strengthened international justice. From the
beginning, the EU member states have remained the Court’s strongest supporters
and are contributing about three quarters of its budget. The EU member states
are also actively promoting its universality and campaigning for new
ratifications. In this regard there is still a lot of work to do to make the
Court truly universal. For the time being the Court has 102 States Parties and
some 40 signatories, who haven’t yet ratified the Rome Statute.

The ICC has been hampered in its pursuit to achieve
universal membership by fears of its independence which is greater than that of
any other international criminal court. The ICC is independent even from the
UN, though it is closely linked to it and the Security Council can refer cases
to the Court and even defer prosecution of a case for 12 months at a time. This
independence of the court from the political institutions, which is a common
rule on the national level, has aroused concern in some parts of the
international community. In this regard it is a great achievement, that of the
162 states, which participated in the negotiations of the Statute of Rome, the
basic charter of the ICC, as many as 139 signed it and by now, four years
later, 102 have ratified it and become States Parties.

The countries still hesitating to become members are a
diverse group by their size and political orientation. The most powerful among
them, the USA, first signed the Statute and then declared the signature not
valid by a new administration. At that time, the EU declared, that according to
their opinion, the concerns of the USA about the future activities of the ICC
are groundless and that the Statute of Rome gives all the necessary guarantees
against the misuse of the Court for political purposes. EU declared that it was
convinced that this will become evident, when the Court will start its
activities.

The hesitations of some of the Signatory States and
the active opposition of the USA seem to have had a chilling effect on some
other countries as well. There are very important countries especially in Asia,
which have not hurried to become States Parties. In that respect, encouraging
signs have appeared that the Court might have an important increase in its
membership in Asia already in 2007. It was also noted as a positive development
that when the UN Security Council decided to refer the case of Darfur to the
ICC the USA did not use the veto it would have had as a permanent member.

The USA has during these four years of the Court’s
history created a large network of bilateral non-surrender agreements. The USA
considers these to be in conformity with the art. 98:2 of the Statute, where
bilateral agreements of that kind are an exception of the general obligation to
cooperate with the Court. This is a juridical question, where there is support
also for the opinion, that the abovementioned articla concerns such agreements
only, if they are made before the Court was established. According to this
opinion, agreements which are made after that are contrary to the purpose of
the Statute and as such not allowed for a member state according to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of the Treaties, art. 18.

Be it as it may, at this point in time, there are
already some 100 such agreements and among the not-yet ratified signatories of
the Statute it is estimated that about half of them have already made such an
agreement.

The EU and the ICC signed a cooperation agreement this
April, among other things, to ease exchange of information and documents. The
activities under this agreement are still under practical preparations mostly
because of strict security rules on both sides. A cooperation agreement is also
being negotiated between the Court and the African Union.

The EU has a Common Position 2003/444/CFSP from the
16th of June 2003 and an Action Plan in furtherance of the Common Position. The
Action Plan established the EU Focal Point and the National Focal Points and a
sub-group of COJUR called COJUR/ICC to carry out this plan.

The Action Plan also concerns promoting universality
and defending integrity of the Rome Statute by, among other means, dialogue,
demarches and cooperation with the NGO:s. Among the concrete measure The Action
Plan says, that the ICC should be mainstreamed in the EU external relations and
that the ratification and implementation of the Rome Statute should be brought
up as a human rights issue in the negotiation of EU agreements with third
countries as well as summits and other high-level meetings with third
countries.

The EU Common Position also establishes that Member
States will contribute to the finalisation of the work under way on the
definition of the crime of aggression, which was left open when the Statute
entered into force.

The definition of the crime of aggression will be one
of the main issues in the Court’s future Review Conferences, the first of which
will be organised in 2009 or 2010. A Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression which is a subsidiary body of the Assembly of the States Parties has
been meeting in inter-sessional meetings since 2004 trying to agree on the
definition. Actually the crime of aggression is already within the Courts
jurisdiction, just like genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes but it
has not been defined and accordingly not used as a starting point for investigation.
The President of the Court Mr. Philippe Kirsch has described the legal
complexities in an interview by stating that the crime of aggression is
considered the supreme crime, without which many other crimes against humanity
would never be committed. According to Kirsch ”there would first need to
be a determination, that a State has committed aggression…the organ that
normally has the competence to determine an act of aggression by a State
against another is the Security Council of the UN. But the Security Council,
when dealing with particular situations, has rarely determined that there was
an aggression…. For example in the case when Iraq intervened in Kuwait, the
Security Council did not determine there was an act of aggression”.

The ICC has during the four years of its activities
already established itself. It has four situations referred to it in Uganda,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic and Darfur the
Sudan. Investigations have been started in all others but not in Central
African Republic. The case in Darfur is interesting, because it was referred to
the court by the Security Council of the UN unlike the others which were
referred by the States Parties.

There have been arrest warrants in Uganda, five
leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army, including Joseph Kony, and one arrest
warrant in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo who was
surrendered to the Court by the government authorities. Kony and other leaders
of the LRA are still at large and the peace negotiations between the government
of the DR of the Congo and the LRA are centred largely on the question of
possible surrendering of Kony to the ICC.

The question, whether to surrender Joseph Kony to the
ICC or not, has been raised by the government of the DR of the Congo which also
initially had requested his arrest warrant. Reactions from EU member states
have been very clearly supportive of the view that the warrant should stand and
the indicted should face justice. Also the ICC Prosecutors office has said that
there is no hurry to cancel the warrant. The Government of Uganda has publicly
stated, however, that Kony will not be surrendered to the ICC, if his
non-surrendering will be a precondition that peace can be achieved.

Including the abovementioned cases, the Court’s
Prosecutor has already three cases under formal investigations and is carrying
out analyses of five situations on four continents. The Court has issued five
international arrest warrants and already has one accused under arrest. These
figures do not reveal the enormous amount of work done in investigations in the
situation countries, where hundreds of potential witnesses are interviewed,
sometimes in very hazardous conditions in the war-torn areas.

All this activity around the Court is a proof that it
is becoming one of the supporting pillars of the international justice and is
ready to contribute in the search for peace and promotion of the rule of law
and democracy.

Today we will be hearing eminent experts tell about
their experiences of fighting against impunity and building up a culture of
accountability. They will be describing all the three strands of this fight;
the role of the ad hoc tribunal ICTY, the national legal systems and the
International Criminal Court.

I wish you active and fruitful discussions.

Fred Kupferman, Pierre Laval. Tallandier, 654 s., Mesnil-sur-l`Estree 2006

Yhteistoimintamies Laval1159424952_laval

Kaksi nimeä yli muiden ovat jääneet historiaan vihatun ja halveksitun saksalaisten natsimiehittäjien kanssa harjoitetun yhteistyön symboleina: Vidkun Quisling ja Pierre Laval. Norjalainen Quisling oli natsi, jonka perustama Nasjonal samling-puolue ei koskaan yltänyt ainoaankaan paikkaan suurkäräjillä. Hän kelpasi kuitenkin saksalaisen nukkehallitsijaksi kun miehittäjä tarvitsi kuuliaisia yhteistyökumppaneita. Quisling onkin jäänyt yleisnimeksi miehittäjävallankanssa yhteistyöhön ryhtyvälle maanpetturille.

Ranskan Vichy-aikainen pääministeri Pierre Laval on paljon moniulotteisempi ja mielenkiintoisempi sekä myös historiallisesti merkittävämpi hahmo. Hän oli pitkäaikainen ja monessa suhteessa tyypillinen Ranskan kolmannen tasavallan poliitikko, joka oli aloittanut kansanedustajan uransa juuri ensimmäisen maailmansodan alla sosialistina, mutta liukunut vähitellen oikealle ja toiminut keskustaoikeistolaisen hallituksen pääministerinä vuosina 1931-32 ja uudelleen vuosina 1935-36. Kun Ranska toisessa maailmansodassa romahti touko-kesäkuussa 1940 ja teki aselevon Saksan kanssa, tuli Vichystä miehittämättömän tynkä-Ranskan pääkaupunki, marsalkka Philippe Petainista sen presidentti ja Lavalista pääministeri. Diktaattorin valtuudet saanut Petain erotti Lavalin myöhemmin joulukuussa, mutta joutui saksalaisten painostuksesta ottamaan hänet uudelleen pääministeriksi keväällä 1942, missä virassa Laval toimi Ranskan vapautukseen saakka. Hänet vangittiin ja teloitettiin pikaisen oikeudenkäynnin jälkeen vuonna 1945.

Vain pieni osa Vichy-Ranskan poliitikoista oli alunperin fasisteja. Kansalliskokous, joka Ranskan tappion jälkeen kesällä 1940 äänesti suurella enemmistöllä Petainin valtaan, oli valittu vuonna 1936 vaaleissa, joka nosti valtaan Leon Blumin johtaman kansanrintamahallituksen. Kun de Gaulle Lontoossa kesäkuussa 1940 julisti jatkavansa Ranskan vastarintaa ei hänellä ollut teolleen muuta muodollista legitimiteettiä kun aselevon solmineen hallituksen nuorimman apulaisministerin asema, eikä ranskalaisten enemmistö – niin kiusallista kuin tämä Ranskan sodanjälkeiselle itseymmärrykselle onkin – pitkään ollut valmis antamaan vastarintaliikkeelle mitään tukea.

Saksalaiset tukivat Vichyn Ranskan autoritaarista hallitusmuotoa, mutta eivät sitä sanelleet. Se oli, rajoitetussa määrin, ranskalaisten oma valinta. Vuoden 1940 tappiotunnelmissa enemmistö oli valmis antamaan entiselle sotasankari Petainille hänen vaatimansa valtaoikeudet. Sodan jälkeen liki 90-vuotias Petain tuomittiin kuolemaan, mutta armahdettiin. Samaa armoa ei annettu Lavalille, jolle muodoltaan hyvin kyseenalaisessa pikaoikeudenkäynnissä annettiin pikaisesti toteutettu kuolemantuomio. Molemmille ratkaisuille oli sodanjälkeisessä Ranskassa kansalaisten hyväksyntä.

Petain ja Laval olivat toisiaan inhonneita, mutta myös toisiaan tarvinneita kilpailijoita. Petain oli luonnostaan autoritaarisen hallitusjärjestelmän kannattaja, pitkän parlamentaarisen uran tehnyt Laval paremminkin ajautui sen toteuttajaksi. Laval ei ollut perinteinen antisemitisti, mutta hyväksyi Vichyn antisemitistisen lainsäädännön eikä estänyt juutalaisten luovutuksia Saksaan; samanaikaisesti hän kuitenkin myös suojeli joitakin juutalaisia. Hän perustutti pahamaineisen Miliisi-joukon ja jätti sen fasistien johdettavaksi, mutta myös pelasti joitain entisiä poliitikkoja sen kynsistä. Laval toimitutti ranskalaisia tosiasialliseen pakkotyöhön Saksaan, mutta yritti kuitenkin koko ajan saksalaisten kanssa neuvotellen minimoida heidän määränsä ja saada sotavankeja vastikkeeksi vapautettua.

Yhteistoimintaan miehittäjän kanssa ryhtyvät ihmiset ovat joskus tilanteissa, joissa vain heidän motiivinsa erottavat isänmaanystävän ja maanpetturin. Lavalin osaksi jäi maanpetturin ikuinen leima. Hän oli yhteistoimintamies, joka oli tietoinen politiikkansa kasvavasta epäsuosiosta ja perusteli toimiaan sekä itselleen että jälkimaailmalle välttämättömyyksinä, jotka suojelivat Ranskaa ja ranskalaisia vielä pahemmalta.

Kupfermanin perusteellinen Laval-elämäkerta on ensimmäisen kerran ilmestynyt jo kaksikymmentä vuotta sitten. Kupferman ei ole vähäisimmässäkään määrin Lavalin puolustaja – hänen isänsä, vastarintaliikkeesssä toiminut juutalainen kommunisti vietiin Auschwitziin, josta hän ei palannut – mutta kykenee arvioimaan kohdettaan kiihkottomasti, objektiivisesti ja jopa tiettyä inhimillistä ymmärrystä osoittaen, pyrkimättä silti millään tavoin puolustelemaan hänen osuuttaan Saksan politiikan käsikassarana.

syyskuu 2006

”Asemmöte var en succe”, kolumni, Hufvudstadsbladet, 19.9.2006

Asemtoppmötet i Helsingfors för en vecka sedan var den mest
krävande  prestationen under vårt ordförandeskap,
åtminstone vad logistiken beträffar. Allt gick bra, också
resultatmässigt. Naturligtvis togs det inga nya beslut som
skulle ha någon omedelbar inverkan på världsläget, men det
var heller inte att vänta av ett möte som varken har
ambitionen eller kompetensen att fatta radikala beslut.
Trots det kan mötet karakteriseras som en succé. Den
bedömningen är befogad för att diskussionerna var öppnare
än tidigare och för att också de frågor som hittills haft
en tabustämpel, som kränkningarna av mänskliga rättigheter
och bristerna i demokratin i många asiatiska länder, kunde
behandlas utan att stöta på ett enstämmigt avståndstagande
från den asiatiska sidan.

Att också Burma/Myanmar var inbjudet till mötet var inte
ett finländskt beslut. Landet kom med i Asem på det
föregående toppmötet i Hanoi år 2004, men i enlighet med
ett uttryckligt krav från EU:s sida skedde det med en lägre
representation än den som de övriga deltagarländerna hade.
Samma mönster tillämpades på toppmötet i Helsingfors. Utan
denna kompromisslösning skulle hela Asem ha äventyrats.
Burma deltog alltså, men med en representation på lägre
nivå än de övriga och i vetskapen om att dess
representanter skulle utsättas för direkt kritik i
klartext. Den kom mestadels från EU-länderna, men inget av
de asiatiska länderna tog heller Burma i försvar under den
öppna diskussionen. I korridorerna och på bilaterala möten
blev det klart att de flesta av de asiatiska länderna var
precis lika frustrerade som EU-länderna med anledning av
situationen i Burma, där de mänskliga rättigheterna bara
har försvagats under den senaste tiden.

Asem innebar sålunda ingen förstärkning av Burmadiktaturens
anseende, vilket många i förväg hade fruktat, utan tvärtom.
Militärjuntan har större skäl att frukta kritik från
landets asiatiska grannländer än från EU, som är lättare
för Burma att förbigå. EU:s betydelse bör dock inte heller
underskattas. Under EU-möten med våra asiatiska partners
kunde man märka att EU:s anseende har ökat en smula som en
följd av att unionen uppträtt enigt och beslutsamt under
Libanonkrisen.

Av frågorna på Asems föredragningslista var
klimatförändringen utan vidare den viktigaste. Man kan
givetvis kritisera slutdokumentet om klimatförändringen för
att dess mångordighet står i omvänd relation till dess
brist på konkreta åtaganden och nya förpliktelser. Men
samtidigt är detta dokument också det hittills mest
långtgående erkännandet av problematikens vikt och ett
uttryck för engagemang från dessa länders sida. Det ger
anledning att tro att det inte är hopplöst att finna
konsensus om de nödvändiga nästa stegen efter Kyoto.

Det är naivt att tro att det inte skulle ha funnits
demonstranter som var redo för våldsaktioner under
Asemmötet. Därför skall polisen ha tack för att det inte
blev några kravaller på Helsingfors gator. Men kunde inte
samma resultat ha nåtts utan att det också gav anledning
till allvarliga beskyllningar mot polisen för övergrepp och
kränkning av medborgerliga rättigheter? Dessa är viktiga
frågor i en demokrati och de bör utredas och evalueras
noggrant, helst utan att de politiseras i onödan.

Puheenvuoro Conference on Enhancing Cooperation between Civil Society and EU Civilian Crisis Management -konferenssissa, Helsinki, 27.9.2006

Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Mr. Erkki Tuomioja

Conference on Enhancing Cooperation between Civil Society and EU Civilian Crisis Management, 27-28.9.2006

                

                     

I am honoured to open this conference on Enhancing Cooperation between civil society and EU civilian crisis management. The Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network (KATU) and Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) have done good work – which started already two years ago – to make this conference happen. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland joined in a year ago and soon after the EPLO became the fourth partner. Now the hard work is done: the ideas have been developed in workshops that have brought together both the representatives from civil society and from EU institutions and member states. Furthermore, Catriona Gourlay’s background paper ”Enhancing Cooperation between Civil Society and EU Civilian Crisis Management in the Framework of ESDP” sums up the ideas and outlines recommendations on how to take those ideas further.

The last 15 years have seen a change in the nature of conflicts. The number of conflicts has multiplied, the number of people affected by the conflicts has grown dramatically and the issues have become more complex.

Difficult crisis situations require multi-dimensional answers. The EU is unique in having a wide range of instruments designed both for long-term and for short-term action. Long-term instruments include i.a. development co-operation, trade, arms control, the strengthening of human rights and rule of law and environmental policies, as well as regular political dialogue. On the other hand, humanitarian assistance and various political measures enable the EU to react immediately on a particular crisis.

In addition to this wide range of tools, our answer has also been to develop both military and civilian measures to address crises. I am proud to say, that Finland, along with Sweden, was among the first EU member states to promote the need to complement the more traditional military crisis management with civilian aspects. Ever since, Finland has been promoting a comprehensive view of crisis management. We see comprehensive crisis management operations, combining both the military and civilian instruments, as our challenge for the future.

The EU has recognised the need for enhanced civil-military coordination in the field of planning, management and conduct of EU crisis management operations. The UK, Austria and Finland presented a non-paper on Enhancing EU Civil Military Coordination in June 2005. Building on the work carried out during the UK and Austrian Presidencies, the Finnish presidency has proposed to examine how EU’s comprehensive approach to operations can be further enhanced through better information sharing and management between EU actors in the field.

Civilian crisis management is one of the priority areas on our ESDP- agenda. We are deeply committed to enhancing the EU’s crisis management capabilities and are ready to explore ways of further improving cooperation with other international organisations, such as the UN, the OSCE, Council of Europe and other groups of countries that are active in this field.

It is important to constantly evaluate the effectiveness of our crisis management policy, and it is evident that the importance of crisis management as a tool of common foreign and security policy will continue to grow. It seems that a truly global approach to crisis management and conflict prevention is increasingly important. A comprehensive approach means that civilian and military action is considered and planned coherently and in parallel in order to ensure the most effective response.

The exchange of views with NGO’s and civil society has an increasing role in developing comprehensive crisis management.

The European Union has developed civilian crisis management for seven years, since its conception at the Helsinki Summit of 1999. Progress in this field has been steady and much has been achieved in a relatively short period. Civilian crisis management has been, and is expected to be, the fastest growing area within the ESDP. It is important to continue to develop civilian crisis management priorities and tools, especially in the field of police, rule of law, civilian administration, monitoring and support to EU’s special representatives. We should continue to study the needs and identify ways to strengthen EU’s capacities and instruments also in the field of human rights and democracy, SSR and DDR. The Aceh Monitoring Mission is a good example of the results that the EU can achieve when different instruments are combined.

We launched our first operation three years ago in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and currently the Union has 10 ongoing operations worldwide. They range from training and mentoring to executive missions.

The Civilian Headline Goal 2008 has been designed to make EU’s action more effective by standardising the procedures and ensuring available resources when they are needed. The Civilian Headline Goal 2008 is a tool to adopt the same systematic approach in civilian crisis management as has been used in military crisis management. By the year 2008 the EU will have the capability to launch complex operations in a short preparation time and in good coordination with military crisis management and if needed, to run several demanding operations at the same time. Civilian Response Teams are a part of the civilian headline goal. The aim is to get them operational in the end of this year. CRT’s are groups that can be deployed on fact finding missions to get accurate information in crisis situations or to temporarily strengthen EU’s other instruments in the crisis area.

Crisis management cannot be achieved without including the views of civil society. The European Union acknowledges the importance of civil society in its Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP that was agreed in 2004. The Action Plan states that ” NGO and civil society views in relation to the general orientations of EU civilian crisis management are welcome. NGO experience, expertise and early warning capacity are valued by the EU.” What we are doing now, at this conference, is to look into ways of further deepening the discussion on our common interests.

Civil society and non-governmental organisations have been approaching the same issues and problems of crisis management from another point of view. The NGO’s and civil society organisations have their natural counterparts in the host country’s civil society. A lot of the work the NGO’s are doing takes place in the field and thus provides a valuable input to the overall approach of international organisations and governments. The Aceh Monitoring Mission is a good example also in this respect: it was the first EU civilian crisis management operation to include a focal point for civil society.

One can often hear criticism that multiple actors in conflict prevention and crisis management tend to concentrate only on their own field of expertise and ignore what others are doing. In many cases better cooperation and coordination between all actors in the field would bring clear benefits. Enhancing that cooperation will save time and effort for all actors, and the final beneficiaries are the people affected by the conflicts.

May I conclude by congratulating you all for the good work done so far and wish you a successful conference.

Thank you.

Puhe EU-US Workshop on Financial Sanctions to Combat Terrorism: Transparency and Fairness in Listing and De-listing, Helsinki, 27.9.2006

Mr. Erkki Tuomioja, Minister for Foreign Affairs

EU-US Workshop on Financial Sanctions to Combat Terrorism:

Transparency and Fairness in Listing and De-listing, 27 September 2006

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great pleasure for me to welcome you to this Workshop that brings together experts from the United States and the European Union to discuss financial sanctions to combat terrorism. The discussions in the next two days will build on the valuable work done in the previous workshops organised in Luxemburg, the UK and Austria. The workshop in Helsinki thus continues a close dialogue between experts from the EU and the US to share practical experiences and to explore ways to enhance the financial sanctions mechanism as an effective tool in the fight against terrorism. As is appropriate between good friends, these workshops also provide a possibility for learning from each other.

The specific theme of the Helsinki workshop is Transparency and Fairness in Listing and De-listing. It is broadly acknowledged that counter-terrorist sanctions directed at individuals and entities create specific challenges that are different from those related to more traditional sanctions. In particular, they raise questions concerning the guarantees of due process and the rule of law. In the 2005 World Summit of the United Nations, the Heads of State called upon the Security Council, with the support of the Secretary-General, to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and for removing them. The issue has been raised in a number of other contexts as well, including in academic studies. It has become a standing item on the agendas of AlQaida-Taliban Committee and its Monitoring Team. The Security Council also considered sanctions and due process in the context of its open debate, in June 2006, on ”Strengthening international law: rule of law and maintenance of international peace and security”.

With regard to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2005 UN Summit Outcome, useful work has also been done by the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs. The study on ”Targeted Sanctions and Due Process” commissioned by the Office of Legal Affairs identifies four main elements related to the rights of due process to be guaranteed in the case of sanctions imposed on individuals and entities. Firstly, the right of a designated person or entity to be informed about the measures taken against them. Secondly, the right of a person or entity to be heard by the Security Council or a subsidiary body. Thirdly, the right of such a person or entity of being advised and represented. And finally, the right to an effective remedy before an impartial institution. Many of these main elements will also be dealt with in the Workshop today and tomorrow.

Sanctions are an important tool to maintain and restore international peace and security. They are an essential part of a comprehensive approach that includes political dialogue and, as a last resort, the use of coercive measures in accordance with the UN Charter. Sanctions are effectively used to support the international efforts to combat terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to uphold respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance. To advance these objectives, the sanctions imposed by the Security Council have to be implemented universally and in an efficient and timely manner. Furthermore, we call for a wide support from our partners for the EU autonomous sanctions regimes.

Sanctions directed against private individuals and entities are part of the trend towards the use of more targeted sanctions, so-called smart sanctions. The purpose of these measures is to directly influence the targeted individuals and entities while reducing negative humanitarian consequences of sanctions. Targeted sanctions regimes often consist of financial sanctions, travel restrictions and visa bans. It has been in particular the freezing of assets and the financial sanctions, which have raised concerns relating to the due process.

Counter-terrorist sanctions typically involve targeted sanctions against private individuals and entities. Their objective, however, differs from other sanctions regimes. Whereas most sanctions regimes are used as incentives to change the targets’ behaviour, financial sanctions to combat terrorism have primarily a preventive effect, as they aim to prevent the financing of terrorism and deter the commission of acts of terrorism.

The tool of targeted sanctions should be constantly developed in order to improve its efficiency. Increased credibility of sanctions regimes will also contribute to the efficient implementation of sanctions. Designated persons are directly and individually affected by financial sanctions. In the EU, it has been agreed that a transparent and effective de-listing procedure is essential to the credibility and legitimacy of sanctions.

The aim of this workshop is to share experiences of procedures and criteria related to the listing and de-listing of individuals and entities for counter-terrorist purposes. The workshop will also discuss ways to improve the transparency and fairness of the relevant sanctions regimes. It will build on the broad experience that the national experts and policy makers from the member states of the European Union and the United States as well as from the EU institutions and the UN bring along with them to this workshop. In addition to delegations from the EU and the US,I also welcome the representatives from the Acceding Countries, Romania and Bulgaria, as well as from Switzerland and Norway to the workshop.

I encourage you to make this a very useful workshop and wish that you enjoy your stay in Helsinki.