Etusivu 2006 kesäkuu 2006
6.6.2006

”EU:ta voidaan vahvistaa vaikka perustuslakisopimus viivästyykin”, Keski-Uusimaa, 1.6.2006

Hallituksen on määrä antaa esityksensä Euroopan Unionin perus­tuslakisopimuksen ratifioimisesta huomenna eduskunnalle. Onko tämän monien jo kuolleeksi julistaman sopimuksen ratifiointi enää ylipäätään järkevää?

Eduskunnan selvän enemmistön tahdon noudattaminen on tietenkin jo riittävä syy ratifiointiin. Vaikka kävisikin niin, ettei perustuslakisopimus tässä muodossa koskaan tulisi voimaan ja että mahdollinen uusi sopimus jouduttaisiin käsittelemään aika­naan uudelleen, ei menettelystä seuraa mitään vahinkoakaan. Puheenjohtajakautemme kannalta saattaa myös olla eduksi, että ratifioimalla esityksen nyt teemme näyttävästi selväksi sitoutu­misemme EU:n kehittämiseen ja vahvistamiseen.

Perustuslakisopimuksen lopullinen kohtalo on epävarmaa. Jos sopimukseen vielä tehdään muutoksia, niin todennäköisesti niihin kuuluu tästä epäonnistuneesta nimestä luopuminen, onhan se johta­nut monet vastustamaan sopimusta, koska luulevat sen sisältävän asioita, joita siihen ei sisälly. Tosiasiassa sopimus on saman­lainen valtioidenvälinen sopimus, kuin ne nykyiset perussopimuk­set jotka se korvaisi.

Suomessa sopimuksella on nimestään riippumatta kuitenkin perus­tuslailli­nen ulottuvuus. Eurooppa-neuvoston muuttuminen EU-insti­tuutioksi korostaa parlamentaarista demokratiaa ja selkeyttää meidän perustuslaillista käytäntöämme.

Perustuslakisopimuksen tuumaustauon jatkuminen ei kuitenkaan tarkoita että EU olisi lamaantunut saatikka syvälli­sesti jakaan­tunut. Kaikki pitävät päinvastoin tärkeänä, että Unioni pystyy etenemään niillä aloilla joissa euroskeptisim­mätkin kansa­laiset odottavat tuloksekkaampaa toimintaa EU:lta: yhteisen ulko- ja turvallisuus­politiikan vahvistamista ja arki­turvallisuu­den paran­tamista uusien turvallisuusuhkien edessä.

EU:ssa pohditaan myös laajasti sitä, miten monien kansalaisten horjuvaa luottamusta EU-projek­tiin voitaisiin vahvistaa. Euroby­rokraattien rakastamilla mainos­kampanjoilla ja julistuk­silla ei tilan­netta kuitenkaan paranneta. Tarvitaan konkreetti­sia, ihmis­ten selvästi parannuk­siksi kokemia toimia, jotka osoittavat unionin kyvyn vastata heidän tarpeisiin­sa. Toinen puoli asiassa on myös se, että pois­tamalla tarpeetto­man ylisääte­lyn aiheuttamia ärsy­tyksen­aiheita – Suomen osalta esi­merkkeinä susien määrän säätely Brys­selissä, valastarkkailijat Itämeren kalastusaluksil­la, ter­vankäy­tön rajoi­tukset tai Suomen rahapeli­monopolien uhkai­lu – voidaan välittö­mimmin vahvistaa EU:n nauttimaa luottamusta.

6.6.2006

Remarks presented at a discussion on The Future of the European Social Models in a panel with Anthony Giddens and Pekka Himanen, Helsinki, 5.6. 2006

The European Social Model as a concept is a relatively recent invention, and I am not sure that such an animal really exists. If it weren’t for globalisation and the competition it is per­ceived as entailing between the US, Europe and China/Asia, we would not be talking about a European Social1 Model. Thus the plural title of this event referring to the European Social Models is the correct one to use.

Indeed, it has been customary to distinguish between at least three different kinds of Welfare state models, the Anglo-Sa­xon/liberal, the Central European/corporative and the Nordic/So­cial-Democratic model. This was not only an intra-European dis­tinction, as the more developed countries outside Europe could also be analysed using the same categories.

To juxtapose a European Social Model and the American one – which I would hesitate to call a social model at all – is motiva­ted by reality as well as politics. The reality is determined more by the neoliberal orientation of American society and poli­tics and its prononounced estrangement from European values than by convergence between the European models.

The politics are determined by the need to deepen integration in Europe where the European Social Model is a popular conceptional tool with which to rally support for the Lissabon strategy and all it entails in its (forlorn) striving to make Europe the most competitive region in the world by 2010. Thus the strategy docu­ments stres­s not only economic competetiveness but also social and ecological competetiveness.

Nevertheless many Europeans see the reality as rather one-sided­ly emphasizing the first one. Particularly after the adoption of the strategy six years ago it was customary to look only at the US as the example to follow in terms of productitivity, emplo­yment and economic growth.

Today the situation has become somewhat more balanced. More and more analysts and policymakers are beginning to doubt the wisdom of comparing ourselves with the US and have increasingly started to look at the best practices and results that can be found in Europe. Not surprisingly, it is the Nordic countries that have set the example, as  all five of them are usually to be found among the top dozen countries in any of the international beauty contests where countries are rated for their performance in compe­ti­tivity, their R & D spending and application of ICT, lack of corruption, the efficiency of their public adminis­ta­tion, the level of environmental care, equality of income dist­ribution, freedom of press and so forth. Also using the scorebo­ards for measuring the EU countries’ ful­fillment of the Lissabon strategy goals the Denmark, Sweden and Finland come out on top.

For two decades or so our electorate has been subject to relent­less bombardment from the powers-that-be and the media in their service telling us, that our Welfare state never was and cer­tainly no longer is sus­tainable and that we have to forego our universal social services and job security, cut social security, public spending and taxes, privatize, outsource and open up for competion anything that moves; in short go for the full monty of the neoliberal agenda in order to survive.

Most people in our countries have never believed this and no political party has had much success campaigning on an open neoli­beral programme and/or promises of large-scale tax cuts (as opposed to doing this after elections). Fortunately, encouraged by the assesment of those who, looking from the outside, tend to see the Nordic Model as an example, the recognition has been growing that the Nordic Model of a Welfare State, far from being a hindrance to our suc­cess, has on the cont­ra­ry been an essen­tial ingrediant of any relative success we have had in a globa­lizing world economy.

This is not to say that the Nordic countries are perfect, nor does it justify and complacency about the future of our so­cieties. We are not clones in the Nordic family either. While Finland comes out on top on many criteria, we have the worse Nordic record on unemployment and our social services and social security coverage are less comprhensive than in other Nordic countries, which have lead some people in Finland to question if we really qualify as a Nordic Welfare State at all.

Broadly speaking, all European count­ries face the same challen­ges of global competiti­on, lagging productivity and aging popula­tions. The Nordic countries are no exception, but the important thing is that they seem to have a better basis for meeting them.

The Nordic countries, with their investment in R & D and their high quality of basic and higher education, are known for their techonolgical inventiveness and innovati­veness. But are they social­ly innovative as well? I think the answer is yes, bearing in mind that there is no need to re-invent the wheel.

Where the neoliberal view of the social partners tends to be negative, we regard them as important elements for Finnish suc­cess. Again, they are not perfect, but current problems in in­dustrial relation in the forestry industry are the exception, not the rule. The social partners have been able to guarantee wage stabi­lity, agree on flexible labour market practices and also to contribute to the necessary adjustments and changes to our pensi­on schemes in a way, which means that there is no ”pension bomb” ticking away as is the case in most other European countries – provided of course, that we are able to bring down our unemploy­ment and raise the effec­tive age at which people go on pension.

Most of the things we need to do to ensure the sustainability of our welfare model are self-evident and uncontentious: invest in education and research; encourage innovations, entrepreneurship, risk-taking and creativity; be flexible and adaptive and so forth.

Equally important is to ensure that the universality of our social services and security are retained, that income and wealth diffe­rentials are not allowed to grow and that the central crite­rion by which we judge the success or failure of our policies is the welfare of the least well-off people in our society.

All this is of course easier said than done, How to understand and deal with, for example, any trade-offs between equality and security on the one hand and efficiency and growth on the other? Economists and social scientists can offer their services and they should be used. But at the end of the day the choice between different social models is not primarily determined by objective evaluations of their performance, but by the underlying values behind them.

A final word of caution. Notwithstanding the relatively high marks we have received for environmental policies, we are not yet set on the course of ecologically sustainable development. Our energy policies are particularly vulnerable on this. Finland is becoming a model country for the nuclear industry as well, which not all people regard as exemplary. Nuclear energy in its present forms cannot be part of the sustainable energy use we need to achieve sooner rather than later. If this is understood then nuclear power can be useful, accepta­ble and even necessary during the transition to a sus­tainable energy economy, but not if nu­clear power is regarded as a panacea setting us free of the constraints of ecological liabilties, as is too often the case today.

When people talk about the need to reform the welfare state it is not always easy to know if they are in the business of saving or dismantling the welfare state. During our economic crisis of the 1990’s we were forced to do some heavy cuts in public expenditure. It was a time when, to paraphrase Melternich’s remarks on collabolators in the Europe occupied by Napoleon’s armies, patriots and traitors could only be distinguished from each other by their motives.

1.6.2006

Antti Kujala, Paperiliiton historia 1906-2005. Paperiteollisuuden työmarkkinasuhteet ja suomalainen yhteiskunta, Paperiliitto ry, 676 s., Vammala 2006

1149158837_Paperiliiton_historia.jpg

Vankkaa Paperia

Antti Kujalan vastajulkaistussa kirjassa ei ole tingitty paperin määrästä eikä painotyön laadusta. Se olisikin ollut erityisen epäsopivaa kun aiheena paperiteollisuuden työntekijäliiton historia. Monen komean ja painavan juhlakirjan – vaakani mukaan tässä tapauksessa kolmekiloisen – ulkoisen ja sisäisen laadun välillä on usein ristiriita. Antti Kujalan tekstin laatu kelpaa kuitenkin vaikeuksitta näin komeaan pakettiin. Teksti sinänsä on sujuvaa ilman, että siinä on ollut tarpeen tehdä myönnytyksiä luettavuudelle historiatyön laadun kustannuksella, mutta sitä on niin paljon – reilu tuhat sivua normaalikokoisessa kirjassa – että en usko kovin monen sitä kirjan runsaasta selailukevennystä tuovasta kuvituksesta huolimatta kannesta kanteen lukevan.

Nykyisin ammattiliitoilla, yrityksillä ja muilla yhteisöillä on sekä varaa että tahtoa satsata korkeatasoisiin historianteoksiin. Paperiliitto on satavuotishistoriaansa varten palkannut Suomen ja Venäjän historian dosentin Antti Kujalan, jonka aiemmat ansiokkaat työt eivät suoraan tällaiseen nykypäivään saakka ulottuvaan sosiaali- ja taloushistoriaan viittaa.

Paperiliiton historiasta onkin jo todettu, että Kujala tuo tarkastelun niin lähelle nykypäivää että hirvittää. Niinpä viime vuoden dramaattinen paperiteollisuuden työsulku on myös kirjassa kattavasti läpikäyty ja analysoitu. Viime vuosien käsittely on pakostakin journalistisen otteen sävyttämää historiankirjoitusta ja voi varautua siihen, että kuva ja tulkinnat vielä aikanaan täydentyvät ja täsmentyvät. Samalla tämä tuorein osuus on kuitenkin selvästi elävämpää ja lukijaystävällisempää kuin varhaisempien vuosien käsittely.

Kujalan vahva tausta yleisen historian osaajana näkyy kirjassa hyvin. Hänellä on varaa heittää sellaisia toteamuksia, kuten esim. Lapuan liikkeestä miten ”Miten Mannerheim oli mestari käyttämään toisia bulvaaneinaan niin, ettei hänen itsensä nimi tahriintunut, jos jokin meni vikaan”; tai miten 80-luvulla ”Neuvostoliitto ei enää kyennyt estämään kokoomuksen tuloa hallitukseen”.

Hyvää kirjassa on myös se, ettei kirjoittajalla ole ollut esteitä eikä estoja käsitellä kaikkia osallisia – Paperiliiton korkeinta johtoa myöten – avoimesti ja kriittisesti. Vihtori Rantasen 40-luvun lopun lahjusjupakka, joka valtavirran kuvauksissa on tähänasti sivuutettu kommunistien propagandana, saa vivahteikkaamman käsittelyn; samoin on avoimesti ja tasapuolisesti käsitelty Jarmo Lähteenmäen ennenaikaisen liitosta lähdön taustaa ja henkilöasetelmia.

Kujala ei ole rajoittanut tarkasteluaan vain Paperiliiton tekemisiin ja sisäiseen kehitykseen, vaan kattaa teoksen alaotsikon lupaamalla tavalla laaja-alaisesti niin yleisen valtioelämän, vasemmistopuolueiden sisäisen ja keskeisen kehityksen kuin myös paperiteollisuuden työnantajaliiton kehityksen niihin liittyvinen henkilöarvioineen. Välillä tarkastelu on jopa niin laajaa, että Paperiliitto voi jäädä jonkun mielestä vähän liiankin taka-alalle. Se ei ole puute vaan seuraus laaja-alaisesta tarkastelutavasta. Puutteena sen sijaan voi pitää sitä, että itse paperityöntekijäin historia eli se miten paperiteollisuussa tehtävän työn luonne ja siitä seuraavat sosiaaliset suhteet ovat kehittyneet on jäänyt lähestulkoon kokonaan kirjassa käsittelemättä. Sen toki Kujala itse myös esipuheessaan toteaa esittäen samalla toivomuksen, että Paperiliitto joskus vielä käynnistäisi ja tukisi paperityöntekijöiden aseman muuttumista koskevaa tutkimusta.

Pienenä miinuksena on todettava lähteviitteiden niiden tarkistamisen kannalta ajoittain turhan suurpiirteinen merkitsemistapa.

toukokuu 2006

1.6.2006

Puheenvuoro Global governance: Problems and Prospects -symposiumissa, Helsinki, 1.6.2006

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great pleasure for me to open this symposium that has been organized on the occasion of the establishment of the Centre of Excellence in Global Governance at the University of Helsinki.

We live in a world that is getting smaller in terms of how we define the burning issues and how we see the possible solutions. The threats and challenges we face are increasingly often of a global nature. The European Security Strategy of 2003 mentioned terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states and organised crime as threats to Europe and, at the same time, as threats that are increasingly global and interconnected in nature. The UN Summit of 2005 acknowledged the interdependence between security, development and human rights. This understanding can now be seen as a part of the acquis of the UN reform efforts.

The world has shrunk before. The 20th century lived through two world wars, the nineteenth century saw the peak of colonialism. Living in the first decade of the 21st century we have taken an unprecedented step in acknowledging that none of the new challenges can be solved by national might alone, however big the national ambitions. This may be evident for small countries, which often have been in the forefront when it comes to compliance with and implementation of international norms and obligations. The UN Summit, however, reflected a general consensus on the existence of a situation where no single nation can efficiently deal with global challenges such as the eradication of poverty, pandemics, natural disasters, the proliferation of WMD and global terrorism. Effective multilateralism and greater efforts to bring about a rules-based international order are necessary to achieve progress in countering global threats.

International terrorism is a paramount example of the new threats. The terrorist attacks directed against the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, claimed a larger number of victims than any other single terrorist operation in history. The unprecedented scale of the destruction made it possible for the international community to equate the strikes with an armed attack in the meaning of the UN Charter. The largest and best-known of the new kind of terrorist structures, Al Qaeda, reportedly operates in more than 60 countries. Compared to the “first generation” of international terrorists that emerged in the 1970´s, it is the first truly multinational terrorist structure in the history.

While also ”counterterrorism has gone global”, to quote the first chairman of the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorist Committee, Sir Jeremy Greenstock of the UK, and has received unprecedented support with all UN member states reporting to the Committee on their national measures to implement the UNSC resolutions, it is clear that much work remains to be done before all states are in compliance with their international obligations. An elaborate legal framework to combat terrorism is in place in the form of the thirteen UN Conventions and Protocols to combat terrorism, three of which were completely renewed last year. Universal ratification and full implementation of these instruments is a key to the effectiveness of international cooperation to bring terrorist offenders to justice.  Technical assistance to strengthen the legislative and administrative capacity of states to combat terrorism is a new area of international coordination and cooperation, both among individual donors and among international and regional organisations.

International terrorism is also an example of the interconnectedness of the threats to peace, security and well-being of the world today. Regional conflicts, bad governance, state failure and real and perceived humiliation of disadvantaged groups are generally recognized as factors that may provide breeding ground for recruitment into terrorism. Efforts to resolve conflicts and to promote good governance, in addition to developing state capacity to prevent terrorism, are therefore at the heart of a sustainable long-term strategy to fight terrorism. Equally important is to broaden our understanding of the factors and conditions that are conducive to violent extremism. The Strategy to combat Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism that was adopted by the EUI Council in December 2005 is a step in that direction.

Another large issue that underlines the importance of global governance is the increasing demand for natural scarce resources, such as clean water and oil. While resource wealth can also lead to conflicts, the problems related to, in particular, the scarcity of the vital resource of clean water can be expected to give rise to disputes in the future. It is therefore necessary to find ways to manage natural resources effectively and sustainably in a just manner. Attention should be paid to the management of natural resources especially in countries that are at risk of conflict. Moreover, specific problems arise in regard to the natural resources that are located in the territories of two or more neighbouring states, such as groundwater resources that cross territorial borders.

How can we act to prevent or at least to reduce the number of such conflicts and to develop mechanisms to resolve them? It is difficult to offer one viable resolution to so many different local questions. International arrangements should therefore be flexible enough to allow necessary adjustments at the regional level so that the local characteristics can be taken into account. International instruments should aim at encouraging states to develop regional solutions and to build up mechanisms to manage natural resources effectively and sustainably.

Violent conflicts pose a serious challenge to development, human rights and global governance. Most armed conflicts have emerged from instability and violence within States rather than from inter-state friction. Widespread and systematic violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have been prevalent. Large-scale violations of rules protecting civilian populations are typical in situations where the state’s judicial system and central institutions are not capable to work, of where they may themselves be party to human rights violations under the guise of defending the state against terrorism. The existing human rights law is not well equipped to handle such situations. Essentially based on the rules concerning state responsibility, the protection of human rights become diffuse in failed state situations where it is not always clear how the responsibility may be enforced. The protection of civilians and the enforcement of the rules of international humanitarian law has become a main concern to the international community. The UN Summit of 2005 recognized, for the first time, that the international community has a shared responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

Internationalisation of criminal law has been a major development during the past decade. Just as the codification of international humanitarian law – and the creation of the United Nations itself – took place in the wake of the horrors of the Second World War, the devastating civil wars during the last decade have sensitivised the international community to the need to strengthen human security and to advance the rule of law. It has been recognized that there are crimes of concern to the international community as a whole and that there needs to be accountability for such crimes.

The establishment of the International Criminal Court is an example of a development that some have called ”the legalization of international relations”. While that particular term may be too ambitious, it is appropriate to speak of a gradual strengthening of the rule of law in international relations. International criminal law has been in the forefront of such a development. The Rome Statute of the ICC was adopted in 1998, it entered into force four years later, and since 2003, the Court has become fully operational. Four situations are under the Court´s consideration, the first arrest warrants have been issued, the first preliminary proceedings have begun, and the first suspect has been arrested. The referral by the UN Security Council of the Darfur situation to the ICC last year was a landmark in the integration of the ICC in the system of collective security and recognition of the contribution it can make to the maintenance of peace and security.

The International Criminal Court is filling a void in the system of international criminal law in the sense that it complements national courts when they fail to act. At the same time, and as an instance of last resort, the ICC encourages States to fulfill their obligations to bring to justice those responsible for atrocities.  In that way the ICC will strengthen the culture of accountability also indirectly leaving less safe havens for the perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Let me mention in this context that the process of reviewing the provisions of the Penal Code so as to bring them into accordance with the ICC Statute is underway in Finland. 

There are many challenges related to the Court´s quest for universality – with one hundred ratifications the glass is only half full. A critical factor affecting the ability of the ICC to function effectively is state cooperation which is threatened by the recent emergence of a network of bilateral agreements prohibiting the surrender of the other party’s nationals to the Court. The Secretary-General of the UN has emphasized the expansion of the rule of law as the foundation of much of the social progress achieved in the past. He has also, very rightly, pointed out that much remains to be done to effectively establish the rule of law in international relations. To be effective, international law cannot rely on à la carte application. Commonly agreed rules must apply to all States. While deviation from the rules may serve national interests of States in the short term, it creates uncertainty and may undermine the legal standards on which multilateral cooperation relies.

A global approach does not, however, mean that there should always be comprehensive solutions; a panacea for all problems does not exist. Sectorial strategies and methods as well as issue-specific, even situation-specific rules are needed, but they should not be compartmentalized or undermine each other. Concern has been raised about the possibility that the sheer increase in the number of international legal instruments, or international adjudicative bodies with overlapping scopes and competences could lead to fragmentation of international law. This question has been extensively discussed by the UN International Law Commission, under the lead of Professor Martti Koskenniemi. He has held, on the one hand, that it is impossible in a globalizing world to do away with such normative conflicts altogether. On the other hand, specific rules must always be seen in the wider framework of general international law which is not a random collection of directives but a purposive system that can provide means for solving the conflicts.

My final comment on the challenges to global governance relates to the actors. Rule of law in international relations can only come about through the strengthening of multilateral institutions. However, governments, international organizations and donors are not the only relevant actors. Non-governmental organizations and business communities also have a role in combating resource scarcity, insecurity and inhumanity. It is quite telling that even the UN Secretary General´s new report on recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy contains an appeal to the civil society to join forces with the UN and its member states to dissuade disaffected groups from choosing or supporting terrorism as a tactic. 

Before concluding, I would like to say a few words of the particular project we have been invited to ”kick off”. The Centre of Excellency programmes in Finland are coordinated by the Academy of Finland which has defined their aims as follows: ”The national centre of excellence policy is aimed at raising the goals and quality standards of Finnish research and increasing its international competitiveness and exposure and the esteem of research.” Furthermore, ”[u]nits appointed to the programme are research and researcher training units that consist of one or more high-profile research groups that are either at or very close to international cutting edge in their own field of expertise.” It has been a timely and well-deserved decision to appoint a Centre of Excellence dedicated to research in international relations and international law.

Six different research areas have been identified for the Centre: 1) global political economy, 2) regulation and reform of world trade, 3) the internationalization of criminal law, 4) the reconceptualization of human rights, 5) non-state actors and authority, and 6) the limits of international law and the legitimacy of global governance. All these areas are equally relevant for the threats and challenges I referred to, and it may be expected that the different teams can benefit from each other’s work.

The Centre of Excellence in Global Governance Research incorporates three disciplines: international politics, international law and social anthropology. It promises to take a broad view on globalisation and questions of global governance making use of the perspectives of the different disciplines and seeking to integrate them in an innovative way. It also aims at broad co-operation with both international and national networks and political decision-makers. All this should be commended. The interdisciplinary approach as well as the open-minded search for dialogue with a broad range of actors involved in designing and implementing forms of global governance, or analyzing and testing the merits of different solutions is a good point of departure for successful research on research areas that are of such breadth and complexity as those I just mentioned.

One of the key objectives of the establishment of centres of excellence within the academic world has been to promote interdisciplinary research. When research programmes are composed of a number of closely related projects working in the same field of research, centres of excellence strive for greater exchange between different disciplines. Their goal can be to address a certain research area from the point of view of different disciplines which complement each other, or to aim at further integration so as to be able to raise questions from within the methods and the theoretical framework of one discipline to be answered by another, or even to create a joint theoretical frame. Even if the research problems are defined in terms of a single discipline, it is important to be able to see the interconnected nature of the global processes that are being analysed.

With these words I would like to open the symposium. I wish every success to the new Centre of Excellence in Global Governance Research, and hope you will have fruitful discussions today and tomorrow.

Thank you