Carl Bildt and Erkki Tuomioja ,Foreign Ministers of Sweden and Finland: Give Diplomacy a Chance, International Herald Tribune, 21.3.2012

Carl Bildt and Erkki Tuomioja

The authors are Foreign Ministers of Sweden and Finland

Give Diplomacy a Chance

We are deeply concerned about all the loose talk regarding a possible military attack on Iran because of the uncertainty over parts of its nuclear program.

Not only would such an attack be a clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations. It would also risk severely negative repercussions in wide and sensitive regions at the same time as it might well be counterproductive in terms of the objectives it would seek to achieve.

It is actually difficult to see a single action more likely to drive Iran into taking the final decision to acquire nuclear weapons than an attack on the country. And once such a decision is taken it would only be a matter of time to turn it into reality.

Serious analytical reports assess that Iran had a nuclear weapons program up until the end of 2003. We should not forget that these were years when it was widely assumed that Saddam Hussein, who had launched a devastating war against Iran, also had such a program.The years since then have been a period of hardened positions and strengthened sanctions, but also of missed diplomatic opportunities.

There is little doubt that there was an open Iranian attitude in 2003 and the immediate period thereafter, but US policy at the time blocked exploration of the possibilities. There is little doubt that infighting in Iran after the 2009 election blocked its acceptance of a generous and constructive offer related to its research reactor. And there is, in our opinion, little doubt that we would have been in a better position now had we explored further the opening generated by Turkish and Brazilian diplomacy in the spring of 2010.

But now diplomacy will be given a new chance after nearly two years of diplomatic inaction. And this time, we should aim for a sustained diplomatic engagement that seeks to build trust through a series of steps, as bridging the immense gulf of mistrust will not be done in a day.

Iran certainly has its rights under the NPT, but it also has its obligations. And it must understand that its past behavior has created the misgivings concerning its intentions that are now there.In its own interest it should consider the steps that could start remedy that situation.

From 2003 to the beginning of 2006 Iran voluntarily applied the Additional Protocol with its more comprehensive and intrusive inspection arrangement, and few steps would be more important in building confidence than Iran going back to agreeing to this protocol and proceeding to promptly ratify it. Indeed, this inspection regime, as well full co-operation with IAEA, is key to any agreement between Iran and the international community on the nuclear issue.

Moreover, it now seems that Iran has – or will soon have – completed the uranium enrichment to 20% that it explains by the need to produce new fuel for its research reactor. In its own logic, it would make sense to then suspend these activities. Possible new research reactors will take a long time to produce, and international arrangements for them should in that case be possible.

We remain deeply critical of the human rights situation in Iran, and will continue to bring these issues also to international attention. Nevertheless, the countries soon restarting talks with Iran should state that their intention, in taking up human rights issues or with imposing sanctions, is not to change the regime, and that we seek an engagement with Iran in a comprehensive fashion also on a number of other issues.

We have, for example, a deep interest in the modernization of Iran, and we should declare our readiness to help with this as well. The modernization of its energy sector is urgent. And with its diversified economy, the future potential of the country is substantial.

A military attack against Iran would risk a period of confrontation in the entire region with consequences that no one can fully predict. It could end up producing several nuclear weapons states in what is probably the most volatile area of the world. And there could be war both with and within the Muslim world.

It is not only about now giving diplomacy a chance. It is about recognizing that diplomacy is the only alternative for those seeking a lasting and sustainable solution to the Iran nuclear issue and peace in the region. The other options are options for war and in all probability a nuclear Iran.

The recent report by the International Crisis Group has well described the options on the table. Diplomacy requires both determination and patience. But most important of all, it requires the recognition that it is the only option we have.

 

Give Diplomacy a Chance

We are deeply concerned about all the loose talk regarding a possible military attack on Iran because of the uncertainty over parts of its nuclear program.

Not only would such an attack be a clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations. It would also risk severely negative repercussions in wide and sensitive regions at the same time as it might well be counterproductive in terms of the objectives it would seek to achieve.

It is actually difficult to see a single action more likely to drive Iran into taking the final decision to acquire nuclear weapons than an attack on the country. And once such a decision is taken it would only be a matter of time to turn it into reality.

Serious analytical reports assess that Iran had a nuclear weapons program up until the end of 2003. We should not forget that these were years when it was widely assumed that Saddam Hussein, who had launched a devastating war against Iran, also had such a program.The years since then have been a period of hardened positions and strengthened sanctions, but also of missed diplomatic opportunities.

There is little doubt that there was an open Iranian attitude in 2003 and the immediate period thereafter, but US policy at the time blocked exploration of the possibilities. There is little doubt that infighting in Iran after the 2009 election blocked its acceptance of a generous and constructive offer related to its research reactor. And there is, in our opinion, little doubt that we would have been in a better position now had we explored further the opening generated by Turkish and Brazilian diplomacy in the spring of 2010.

But now diplomacy will be given a new chance after nearly two years of diplomatic inaction. And this time, we should aim for a sustained diplomatic engagement that seeks to build trust through a series of steps, as bridging the immense gulf of mistrust will not be done in a day.

Iran certainly has its rights under the NPT, but it also has its obligations. And it must understand that its past behavior has created the misgivings concerning its intentions that are now there.In its own interest it should consider the steps that could start remedy that situation.

From 2003 to the beginning of 2006 Iran voluntarily applied the Additional Protocol with its more comprehensive and intrusive inspection arrangement, and few steps would be more important in building confidence than Iran going back to agreeing to this protocol and proceeding to promptly ratify it. Indeed, this inspection regime, as well full co-operation with IAEA, is key to any agreement between Iran and the international community on the nuclear issue.

Moreover, it now seems that Iran has – or will soon have – completed the uranium enrichment to 20% that it explains by the need to produce new fuel for its research reactor. In its own logic, it would make sense to then suspend these activities. Possible new research reactors will take a long time to produce, and international arrangements for them should in that case be possible.

We remain deeply critical of the human rights situation in Iran, and will continue to bring these issues also to international attention. Nevertheless, the countries soon restarting talks with Iran should state that their intention, in taking up human rights issues or with imposing sanctions, is not to change the regime, and that we seek an engagement with Iran in a comprehensive fashion also on a number of other issues.

We have, for example, a deep interest in the modernization of Iran, and we should declare our readiness to help with this as well. The modernization of its energy sector is urgent. And with its diversified economy, the future potential of the country is substantial.

A military attack against Iran would risk a period of confrontation in the entire region with consequences that no one can fully predict. It could end up producing several nuclear weapons states in what is probably the most volatile area of the world. And there could be war both with and within the Muslim world.

It is not only about now giving diplomacy a chance. It is about recognizing that diplomacy is the only alternative for those seeking a lasting and sustainable solution to the Iran nuclear issue and peace in the region. The other options are options for war and in all probability a nuclear Iran.

The recent report by the International Crisis Group has well described the options on the table. Diplomacy requires both determination and patience. But most important of all, it requires the recognition that it is the only option we have.